Comparative Politics

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Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies

The Case of Religious Parties

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Democracy opens the political process to actors who are opposed to it. When power-ful religious parties are set to win critical elections in emerging democracies, the future of new and fragile secular and liberal democratic institutions is put in ques-tion.[1] These parties either intend to impose theocratic authoritarian institutions or are willing to forego their objectives and subject themselves to democratic control. In the first case the outcome is certain: democratization fails, either through the full implementation of the religious party's program or through preemptive or reactive military action by its opponents. In the second case the outcome is uncertain: democratization may fail, but it may also succeed. This article explores the second case.

Incumbents in an emerging democracy face challengers who are likely to win a mandate that makes it possible for them to apply their transformational program.[2] Incumbents, in control of the state's repressive apparatus, seek guarantees to protect their basic material interests and their future access to power, while challengers seek power so that they can enact their program. To complicate matters further, both incumbents and challengers typically are divided internally into moderate and radi-cal factions.

This strategic setting has two fundamental underlying features. First, neither incumbents nor challengers can turn their first preferences into policy. In emerging democracies (as opposed to consolidated ones) elections are not yet the only game in town, but neither is the use of force (in contrast to authoritarian regimes). Ballots and bullets are both available, though asymmetrically distributed. Democracy can be the outcome only of compromise. Second, contrary to typical transitions compro-mise is hindered by the challengers' religious identity, as well as by the expectation that they are likely to win an electoral majority that will make possible the full implementation of their program. Incumbents, including the military and secular democrats, find this prospect unacceptable. While an institutional mechanism, coali-tion cabinets, imposes compromise on plurality winners, only force or the threat of force can restrain mandate winners from implementing their full program.[3] In emerging democracies constitutional provisions or checks and balances are not enough. Incumbents find it easier to resort to force before they lose elections (when they are certain that they will lose), rather than after they have lost. However, the use

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of force by incumbents ends democratization. Moreover, aborting an election likely to produce a mandate winner requires extensive use of violence.

Because incumbents control the state's repressive apparatus and challengers can not enforce their electoral victory, the accession of challengers to power following their electoral victory presupposes the incumbents' acquiescence.[4] Rational challengers will have an incentive to signal that, once in power, they will behave moderately and will even guarantee the incumbents' material interests (property rights, rents).[5] However, rational incumbents will distrust such signals and view the challengers as a Trojan horse. The challengers' credibility is further undermined by their reputation for "pious passions, strong beliefs, and inflexible values" and their ideological principles, which include (or are plausibly seen to include) the rejection of liberal democracy as a principle.[6] Yet for democratization to proceed it is necessary (though not sufficient) for religious challengers to solve their commitment problem.[7] They must send credible signals about their postelectoral behavior prior to the elections. How do religious parties succeed or fail to overcome this commitment problem?

The empirical investigation of this problem requires the examination of cases where incumbents are able (and willing) to abort the electoral process and challengers are expected to win mandates. Moreover, since causal inference requires variation, it is necessary to examine cases in which democratization both fails and succeeds, that is, where incumbents comply with and subvert electoral outcomes favorable to religious challengers. I have found only two such cases: Algeria (1988–1992) and Belgium (1870–1884). This scarcity is due to the fact that religious parties (like Communist and Fascist parties) have rarely won mandates.

Algeria is a case of incumbent subversion by force of a mandate winner and subsequent failure of democratization, an "astounding case of a sudden transition from single-party rule to pluralism and back."[8] On January 11, 1992, the Algerian military aborted the country's electoral process and deprived the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) of a sweeping victory, ushering the country into a bloody civil war. Because the Algerian experiment became "grist for the mill in the ongoing debate about Islam and democracy,"[9] its sad end was for many observers a confirmation of the incompatibility of religious mobilization and democratic politics.[10] No contemporary case of compliance with a religious party's mandate victory is available.[11] Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, and India do not fulfill the mandate criterion because religious parties have been in opposition or have participated in coalition cabinets; Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan are instances of revolutionary rather than electoral success of Islamist movements.

Late nineteenth century Belgium offers an instance of a religious party that won a mandate without the incumbents subverting the outcome. A religious movement, Catholic and aliberal, challenged Belgium's young and exclusionary parliamentary regime, which was in the process of democratizing and opening itself up to mass

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participation. The Catholic party, which for the first time included both moderate parliamentarians and grass-roots radicals, won the critical 1884 elections. Incumbents bowed to the electoral outcome even though they had the power to abort it. In turn, the Catholic party, despite the introduction of clerical reforms, did not apply its program in full or question Belgium's secular/liberal institutions. Catholics were incorporated into the liberal order, and religious mobilization proved compatible with democratization. Although religious parties arose in other European countries during the late nineteenth century, none won a parliamentary majority.[12] In the twentieth century authoritarian pro-Catholic movements ruled in Spain, Portugal, and Austria through military coups, not elections.

The difficulty of isolating causality in a small-N comparison (overdetermination) is well-known. However, a comparison designed around an analytical puzzle has the advantage of suggesting causal mechanisms and crucial variables that otherwise would be overlooked. Examination of these two cases in parallel does not imply their similarity in every respect. While they are different in many ways, they share a similar strategic setting. Comparison allows the identification of a key, though not obvious, factor in processes of democratization: the structure of religious institutions.[13] Credibility can be signaled by dramatic actions, such as a party's public denunciation of its central ideological planks (the Godesberg effect) and the purge of prominent radicals.[14] Centralized, autocratic, and hierarchical religious structures allow religious parties, which are typically young and divided, to implement such measures and overcome their commitment problem by credibly signaling future compliance.

This comparison is limited to the analysis of a particular and well-defined strategic situation. It is not a full-fledged exploration of every facet of the process of democratization or a comprehensive examination of the two countries. After a brief description of Algeria and Belgium it examines two major explanations of the failure of democratization in Algeria and the implications of Belgian democratization.

Algeria and Belgium

The FIS appeared on the Algerian political scene in October 1988. In the aftermath of mass demonstrations against the regime's corruption the ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), initiated a gradual process of liberalization. The constitution was revised to end one party rule, and the FIS was authorized in September 1989. Using both mosques and modern communications to propagate its message, the FIS evolved into a mass movement that combined electoralism with mass mobilization, giving rise to a veritable countersociety.[15] It blended a critique of the regime with a utopian project: the "Islamic solution" and the Islamic state. This project was explicitly aliberal and antidemocratic, but was also vague and malleable.[16] The FIS mobi-

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lized the masses "around the myth of a return to an Islamic authenticity that never existed," yet its success also represented a "crushing rejection" of the discredited FLN rather than just a show of support for the introduction of the *shari'a* (the religious law).[17] Although it captured the vote of the urban poor, the FIS was not a movement of the disenfranchised. It enjoyed the support of the middle strata, including state functionaries, shopowners, lawyers, and teachers.[18]

The extent of the FIS's appeal was first suggested by the June 1990 municipal and regional elections, the first multiparty elections since the country's independence.[19] A two round parliamentary election was scheduled for June and July 1991. When the government introduced an electoral law to undermine the FIS, it reacted by calling for a general strike in May 1991. Riots erupted, and the government proclaimed a state of siege and arrested the FIS leaders Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj. Elections were rescheduled for December 26, 1991; the state of siege was lifted at the end of September 1991. The FIS won an impressive victory in the first round. Its victory was inflated by the electoral system, which worked against its designers. It won 47.2 percent of the vote and 188 seats, twenty-eight short of a majority, as opposed to 23.4 percent and just sixteen seats for the FLN; the regionally based center-left FFS won 7.4 percent and twenty-six seats. The second round, scheduled for January 16, 1992, was widely expected to produce a large parliamentary majority for the FIS. "The unthinkable now seemed to be on the horizon: an Islamic movement would come to power not through bullets but through ballots, not by violent revolution but by working within the system."[20] However, the military intervened four days before the second round. Benjedid was forced to resign; a state of emergency was declared; the results of the elections were annulled; and the FIS was banned. The army arrested thousands of FIS activists. This intervention gradually escalated into a bloody civil war.

The FIS was internally divided between moderates and radicals (often called reformers and conservatives or technocrats and theocrats).[21] Both Madani, the party's primary leader and chief ideologue, and Benhadj, a younger radical preacher, called for substantive Islamic reforms. However, Madani was moderate.[22] Moderates were a "modern" elite; many were engineers and teachers who opposed liberal democracy in principle but publicly supported pluralism.[23] They generally recognized the existence of a political order distinct from religion, advocated the amendment, not the destruction, of the existing system, and sought to delimit religious from political functions.[24] Radicals, in contrast, belonged to more traditional sectors of Algerian society. In contrast to Madani, Benhadj denounced the idea of freedom that "raises men against all authority, even God's," popular sovereignty that "contradicts many Koranic verses," and democracy that "places infidelity and faith on the same level."[25]

In the late nineteenth century the young Belgian democracy faced what was in many ways a similar challenge. In 1878 the Liberal party introduced an anticlerical program with a particular focus on education. This program provoked the reaction of

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the Catholic church, the polarization of politics, and the mass mobilization of Catholics. Boosted by this mobilization, the rejuvenated Catholic party won a large electoral victory in 1884 on the basis of a clerical program. Like the Algerian FIS, the Belgian Catholics were initially divided between the moderate parliamentarians of the Conservative party and radical (ultramontane) grass-roots activists. As a Belgian politician pointed out in 1879, "there are two Catholic parties, one favorable and the other hostile to the [liberal] constitution."[26]

The Catholic movement emerged during the 1860s but grew fast after 1878 to challenge the liberal (but nondemocratic) Belgian institutions.[27] As a contemporary observer put it, "a whole army of publicists emerged, pretending that there existed a radical incompatibility between the Belgian constitution and Catholicism, between the country's religion and its political organization."[28] This movement openly rejected liberalism and the separation between the religious and civil spheres. It called for the overthrow of the liberal order, defined as "the negation of the supernatural order applied to politics, exclusion of all religious influence in social relations, full emancipation of social power from divine revelation."[29] The constitution was rejected. "We believe, together with the Church and like the Church, that the principles which flow from the Belgian Constitution are false and subversive, that the separation of Church and State is bad, and that the Constitution, in itself, is bad."[30] This movement was supported by the lower clergy, controlled almost all the Catholic press, and built a large network of popular associations.

Moderate Catholics could be found mostly among the parliamentarians of the Conservative party. Their ideal was, as one of their leaders put it, a "Christian monarchy," but they were willing to compromise and "loyally accept" the liberal constitution, "a situation which is quite away from this ideal."[31] They justified this choice in strategic rather than ideological terms, arguing that "it is more prudent and political to seek not the absolute, but more modestly, the possible and the relative."[32] "By wanting that which we regard as the absolute good, we often jeopardize and lose the relative good."[33]

Although the moderates controlled the parliamentary party, they were weak at the grass roots, where the radicals agitated for the formation of a "truly Catholic party." A vehement conflict erupted between the two factions. At stake was the definition of political Catholicism and control of the Catholic party. Moderates accused radicals of being "very incompetent" and "unsuited for public life,"[34] of "exercising a kind of terrorism on many Catholics" by "denouncing the moderates as semi-heretics,"[35] of seeking "to substitute constitutional politics with theological ones," and of aspiring "to overthrow all our political organization" by "unfurling a revolutionary flag."[36] They demanded that the radicals abandon their maximalist discourse. "In Belgium now...the Constitution is approved and legitimate, and is a good thing; Catholics can not obviously adopt these institutions for ever, but they can declare that they do not intend to use force in order to achieve any change."[37] The radicals refused to comply

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and accused the moderates of opportunism, failure to promote the program "of the Church," and sacrifice of ideological principles to political expediency. They argued that, since the moderates as individuals accepted the authority of the church in their private lives, they ought to do the same publicly as politicians.[38]

Algerian moderates and radicals similarly fought over control of the FIS and the definition of political Islam. Indeed, "the evolution of the party was marked by a leadership war which raged up until June 1991."[39] Disliking "theological digressions," the moderates accused the radicals, sometimes disparagingly dubbed "dervishes," of being "incapable of understanding political action," since they were "men of religion." In turn, the radicals accused them of practicing opportunistic and unprincipled politics that deemphasized faith.[40]

In both Belgium and Algeria moderates were willing to compromise with incumbent reformers and abide by the existing rules. Belgian moderates proclaimed their attachment to the constitution and condemned what they called the "politics of defiance."[41] They controlled their party and locked the radicals out of the parliament. In June 1991 the FIS leadership adopted "a particularly moderate attitude," focused on the "necessities imposed by politics," promoted an "institutional and political strategy" built around participation in elections rather than religious projects, and "disclosed its readiness to coexist with president Chadli [Benjedid]."[42] Ghazi Hidouci, a presidential adviser and member of a reformist cabinet that promoted economic and political liberalization, points out in his memoirs that following the May 1991 riots the new FIS leadership "displayed a scrupulous respect of the Constitution, froze street actions, and demanded legislative elections so that legality could return."[43] In short, the FIS behaved as a legalist party.[44] If moderates controlled their respective parties and were willing to compromise with incumbents in both cases, why did democratization succeed in Belgium but not in Algeria?

The Diverging Outcome

The easy answer would be that these outcomes were predetermined by cultural, economic, and social factors. Authoritarianism was impossible in nineteenth century Belgium, and democracy is impossible in contemporary Algeria. This answer would eliminate all need to study democratization in developing countries. A broader historical and comparative perspective would strongly qualify such deterministic views.[45] Moreover, it would be incorrect to extrapolate backwards and infer teleologically the possibilities of democratization solely on the basis of its outcome. Finally, there is something to be gained from comparison of these countries. As Tilly has pointed out, we ought to compare the European past with contemporary developing nations.[46]

It would also be misleading to argue that democratization is impossible in the

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presence either of a powerful religious movement or more specifically of an Islamist movement. The first is analytically and empirically untenable, but the second remains quite popular.[47] As Waterbury puts it, "where the scriptures are both holy and explicit, as in the case of Islam, pragmatic compromise will be very difficult."[48] Because parties in the Middle East are struggling over fundamental political issues such as the content of public morality, Leca argues, "we may be facing a dead-end since the [democratization] process's prerequisite is also its outcome."[49] Hence "the presence of Islam and the high-risk politics of morality...might leave the Middle East subject to some unique form of strategic calculus that confounds the more mundane logic of everyday political struggle."[50]

The actions of political actors should not be inferred solely on the basis of either religious scriptures or religious ideology. Religious doctrine, like all doctrines, is a contested and malleable field of meaning, amenable to multiple interpretations. Islam has been used to support both democracy and dictatorship, while Islamists creatively deploy selected elements of Islamic tradition to justify their actions. Moreover, political actors' compliance with democratic rules does not necessarily flow from their ideological preferences; it can result from the largely contingent strategic pursuit of their interests under constraints.[51] Democracy can be a spontaneous and self-enforced equilibrium, possible in the initial absence of convinced democrats or mass democratic culture. It can be a "fortuitous by-product."[52]

It is more fruitful to focus on the actual political context. Algeria, unlike Belgium, has attracted considerable attention. Two arguments address its failure to democratize. One emphasizes the role of incumbents, while the other focuses on the challengers. According to the first, Algerian incumbents either were able to be uncompromising or could not afford to compromise. They clang to power, were divided, lacked strong leadership, and had much to lose from an FIS victory. According to the second, the FIS failed to signal credibly that it would not subvert the institutions once it won, thus opening the path for a military coup.

Incumbents Following the war of independence (1954–1962), Algeria became a one party state governed by the FLN. The military became a quasi-autonomous actor within the ruling bloc. Hardliners were unwilling to allow the FIS to come to power. Many reformers, however, were willing to find a compromise with moderate Islamists, provided they received credible guarantees.[53] The argument about incumbents comes in two variations. According to one, when democratization is engineered by a divided elite lacking strong leadership, it is likely to backfire; conspiracies, including by the secret police, are likely to undermine it.[54] However, ruling elites are.usually divided in transitions; indeed, divided ruling elites are the key mechanism that provides the opening for liberalization.[55] According to a variation of this argument, state rent-seeking elites in Algeria had too much at stake and no interest to compromise with the FIS. Reforms were initiated only because the regime

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"feared for its survival."[56] Hence the failure of the transition was caused by the regime's absolute unwillingness to cede power. While this argument has merits, it suffers from serious flaws when seen from a broader perspective.

First, if it were true that a state bourgeoisie and an autonomous military posed insurmountable obstacles to democratization, then many democratic countries would still be authoritarian. Indeed, Latin American and eastern European elites were identified with the state to a much greater extent than Algerian ones.[57] Second, ruling elites rarely initiate liberalization processes with the intention of ceding power.[58] Third, significant groups within the regime sincerely promoted reform. The government conceded the FIS's victory in the municipal elections of June 1990; the moderate faction won the internecine conflict in the FLN in June 1991; and a significant number of FLN officials, including the president of the national popular assembly, were willing to recognize an FIS victory in the parliamentary elections.[59] Both the Hamrouche (September 1989–June 1991) and the Ghozali (June 1991–January 1992) cabinets encouraged moderate FIS elements.[60] Fourth, even the military was not monolithic. Some officers favored a dialogue with the FIS.[61] The military did not instigate a coup following the May riots, when a pretext was very handy. Instead, it reaffirmed its faith in democracy.[62]

Instead of absolute and unchanging preferences, it is more helpful to think in terms of shifting coalitions within the ruling block. It is possible to accommodate an autonomous nondemocratic military during and after transitions. Chile is the paradigmatic case. Finally, the relative weight of the military should not obscure the fact that there were other key players within the ruling bloc. The role and intentions of reformers, including francophone elites, and of assorted secular democrats, the "heterogeneous third force between the two poles," should not be overlooked.[63]

In fact, the agitation in favor of military intervention between the two rounds of the election point to dynamics that are missed by an exclusive focus on incumbents. This agitation was fueled by the shock experienced by many reformers following the FIS's performance in the first round. Significant segments of civil society were genuinely scared by the prospect of an FIS victory. Many Algerians who opposed the FLN's single party rule feared that the FIS would impose a worse authoritarianism. They were convinced that "Islamism is like death: we experience it only once."[64] One after another, parties, unions, women's groups, newspapers, and other associations agitated in favor of military intervention and cancellation of the second round. A *Comité National pour la Sauveguarde de l'Algérie* was formed to coordinate their action. It was headed by the leader of the major labor union (UGTA), who warned that "the UGTA is legalist, but if the institutions do not fulfill their functions and others [that is, the FIS] take over them, our duty is to respond."[65] On January 2, 1992, hundreds of thousands demonstrated in Algiers after a call by the center-left FFS to "save Algeria and democracy." The demonstration opposed both the military and the FIS but was widely advertised as denoting popular support for military inter-

vention. Hachemi Naït-Djoudi, an important personality and former FFS official asked: "Shall we, in the name of formalism and democratism, take the risk of an opening with fascist overtones?"[66] In short, the agitation of significant segments of reformers, reflected in their subsequent support for the military regime, is essential in understanding how the balance tipped in favor of the hardliners within the ruling bloc and needs to be explained.[67]

Challengers   It is impossible to account for the outcome if the challengers are ignored. To a large extent, "the task was to discover a means by which to integrate an opposition force that threatened to subvert the process of democratization itself."[68] According to Labat, the transition in Algeria failed because the FIS, despite being controlled by moderates, eventually proved incapable of managing its internal contradictions and divisions and hence of appeasing the ruling bloc. The FIS was unable rather than unwilling, since appeasing the incumbents was "a necessity felt by the leadership."[69]

   An overview of the events leading to military intervention illustrates this point. The May 1991 riots and the ensuing crackdown "marked the end" of the radicals' power within the party and made possible the complete takeover of the party by the moderates. Under the leadership of Abdelkader Hachani, the moderates initiated a massive overhaul of the FIS, nothing less than the formation of "another," "new" FIS.[70] Moderates assumed full control of the party, including nomination of candidates, at the FIS congress in July 1991; most radicals were knocked off party lists and replaced by moderates.[71] Confronting the radicals, Hachani declared that he had been instructed by Madani to pursue "legal and public competition."[72] The new leadership went to great lengths to overhaul its image.[73] Revolutionary discourse was condemned, and five prominent radicals were suspended from the *majlis as-shura*, the party's executive body. Some radicals, like Saïd Mekhloufi, a former editor of the main Islamist newspaper and the author of a leaflet on civil disobedience, were even expelled. Hachani focused exclusively on issues of electoral strategy rather than religious or social projects.[74]

   The party's effort to transform itself from protest movement into responsible party was reflected in its giant rally, held in Algiers on November 1. The FIS projected "a calm change in continuity" and emphasized slogans that were no longer frightening.[75] Following the first electoral round, it called for "moderation" and "reconciliation" and agreed to work with President Benjedid.[76] On December 29 Hachani declared that "the FIS will guarantee the individual and collective freedoms in the context of Islamic law and will tolerate the existence of non-Islamic parties."[77]

   If the FIS signaled its willingness to play by the rules, why did its prospective victory still appear threatening? Many still wondered if the FIS "was a party like all other parties or a revolutionary movement."[78] Yet the FIS failed to provide a clear answer. It never spoke with one voice but instead oscillated between its two poles.[79] Many scholars have underlined the FIS's "duality" or "double nature."[80] Despite

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their efforts, the moderates did not manage to silence the radicals. Party statements remained vague or contradictory. "The FIS had almost always two discourses, one maximalist, the other minimalist. One threatened, the other appeased; one accelerated, the other braked. It handled confrontation and negotiation....the desire for a radical rupture with the existing order coexisted with the electoralist strategy."[81] There were "innumerable cases of people speaking in the name of the FIS and saying the same thing and its opposite during the same day. Even at the top, leaders were unable to avoid such contradictions....[The FIS] has always been ambiguous, lacking official and definitive public positions to determine [its intentions]."[82] In critical moments, "moderate declarations were stifled by radical ones."[83] Indeed, at the November 1 rally, which the FIS used as a showcase of its moderate image, Benhadj's seven-year-old son reminded party supporters of his father's favorite dictum: "neither Chart, nor Constitution, only God and his Prophet." The crowd responded "*al-thawra al-islamiyya*" (Islamic revolution).[84]

The inability of the moderate FIS leadership to silence the radicals and thus "restrain its own radical impulses" was particularly damaging during the critical period of high uncertainty between the two rounds.[85] For example, a leading figure of the FIS, Mohammed Saïd, declared that the "nutritional and clothing habits of Algerians" would have to change after the party's victory; this statement amplified by the media, sent shivers through "thoroughly frightened" secular Algerians.[86] Although the party reiterated its decision to protect freedom and condemned "irresponsible declarations that can threaten the country's civil peace and unity," the damage was done.[87] In fact, Hachani was overwhelmed by these developments; they left the FIS "vulnerable to criticism and skepticism regarding the true nature of [its] ultimate agenda."[88] Charef summarizes the issue as follows: "Was a negotiation with the FIS possible, so that it could accede to power without destabilizing the country? Would [the FIS] be able to manage things without too many pitfalls and play the democratic game?....This was a risk military leaders did not want to take, because they thought that the moderates within the FIS would be beaten by the radicals."[89]

The FIS failed to solve its commitment problem. It failed to signal that once in power it would not establish a religious dictatorship; it failed to convey that the moderates were in control. Comparison of Algeria and Belgium proves fruitful in explaining this failure. It uncovers a crucial factor that remains invisible in case studies and comparative sampling on the dependent variable.

Belgium

In contrast to Algeria, moderate Belgian Catholics were able to put a swift end to the "confusion between politics and religion" prior to the 1884 elections.[90] Credibility hinges largely on the cost of the signal to its sender. In Belgium the conflict between

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Catholic moderates and radicals was resolved only when the church decided to back the moderates publicly and repudiate and purge the radicals. The church put its reputation on the line. It repeatedly and explicitly condemned radical criticism of liberal institutions and silenced radical leaders who were expelled from the party. It thus indicated tangibly that the Catholic party was under the firm control of moderate leaders willing and able to abide by the rules of the game. Credibility required the intervention of an authority able to implement and enforce these measures. Such an authority was present in Belgium but absent in Algeria.

In an audience given to Belgian journalists in 1879, Pope Leo XIII asked Belgian Catholics to abstain from attacking the constitution.[91] Following this declaration, the Belgian church openly endorsed the moderates and moved swiftly against the radicals, forcing the Catholic press to stop all attacks against the constitution. Moreover, it purged prominent radical leaders, including the bishop of Tournai, Mgr. Dumont, and their chief ideologue, Henri Périn, both of whom were forced to resign in a humiliating way and retire from public life. "By striking Périn vigorously," the church "knew very well that it would disorganize the 'ultramontane' troops;" the blow was swift "because the future of Belgian political Catholicism depended on it."[92] The church's highly visible decision in favor of the moderates and purging of prominent radicals sent a credible signal about the intentions of Catholics five years before the elections of 1884. As the moderate leader Charles Woeste pointed out later, to stop the attacks against the constitution "it was imperative that orders came from the highest possible instance, so that Catholics could continue to participate in public life."[93]

The moderates' diverging ability to silence the radicals can be best explained by a key difference in the institutional structure of Catholicism and Islam.[94] The former possesses a clearly defined hierarchical organization. The latter has a loose and decentralized structure with no clergy, and religious discourses and idioms compete on several levels. A body of lettered men, the ulamas, fulfills a variety of functions but lacks a monopoly over worship and, except in Iran, does not answer to a higher authority. The Algerian state made consistent efforts to create an official clergy under its control. Imams became state functionaries under the jurisdiction of the ministry of religious affairs, and religious education was centralized in 1983. As an observer noted at the beginning of the 1980s, "it is quite possible that, after the [reforms are] extended to the whole country, nobody will be able to lead the prayer in a mosque without being graduated from a [state] institute."[95] However, the regime failed to complete this ambitious program. The rise of the FIS interrupted the process of state regulation of religion, leaving a situation of institutional anarchy in the religious field.[96] Hundreds of mosques, known as *ash-sha'b* (popular) and *huriyya* (free), were built without official permission. The official priests, or "state ulamas," failed to impose their control. A new generation of unofficial young clerics, lay preachers, and self-proclaimed imams free of any religious authority preached the message of radical

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Islam from the thousands of mosques that escaped state control.[97] The FIS attempted to establish its own authority over religion and to subject the imams to party approval but had difficulty in achieving this goal. The absence of a reputable religious authority with the power to implement costly decisions swiftly and effectively placed the burden of signaling future compliance on the FIS moderates alone.

In sum, the centralized, autocratic, and hierarchical organization of Catholicism allowed moderate Catholics to solve their commitment problem, while the absence of a comparable structure in Algeria contributed to the inability of the moderate FIS leadership credibly to signal its future intentions. It is indeed ironic that Islam's open, decentralized, and more democratic structure eventually contributed to the failure of democratization, while the autocratic organization of the Catholic church facilitated a democratic outcome.

Caveats, Counterfactuals, and Implications

Why did the radical Catholics in Belgium submit to the church hierarchy instead of disobeying? The ability of the church to silence the radicals is explained by three factors. First, strong organizations are good at in-group policing. Obedience to the pope is a central element of religious practice in Catholicism and formed the basis of radical Catholicism (ultramontanism). Disobeying the pope was an act of utmost gravity that could lead to permanent expulsion from the church, whereas challenging the FIS in Algeria would not have deprived radicals of their Muslim identity. Second, young parties are easier to control than older institutionalized parties. Both the Catholic party in Belgium in the late 1870s and the FIS in Algeria were young. Third, it is contingent on the cooperation of the party's leadership. Without the active cooperation of the moderates, the church would have faced great difficulties in silencing the radicals.[98]

Religious institutions are crucial in democratization processes involving religious parties. They mediate in nonobvious ways between political actors and their actions. However, the ability of a centralized religious hierarchy to help a party solve its commitment problem does not imply that it will necessarily help the party, and it is impossible to know how a hypothetical hierarchical religious authority would have acted. While these counterfactual questions are important enough to warrant a separate study, it is worth asking why a hypothetical Islamic authority would have supported the FIS moderates. The comparison with Belgium suggests three reasons. First, religious hierarchies tend to be conservative and risk-averse. When given a choice, they tend to opt for fewer, but certain, over bigger, but riskier gains, especially when the risk includes harsh repression. The Belgian bishops were closer to the radical Catholics in terms of ideology and were evenly divided in terms of strategy. However, when they realized that significant losses could be averted with a moderate

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Catholic victory at the polls, they sacrificed their theocratic dreams and threw their weight behind the moderates.[99] Second, religious hierarchies tend to collude with party elites rather than grass-roots underdogs, because they seek to maximize their political impact. Finally, they dislike and fear overzealous laymen who threaten to usurp their authority and supplant them. In Algeria the official ulamas were marginalized by radical lay preachers who attacked them for their "servility to the powers in place."[100] It is fair to hypothesize that, if these ulamas had had the power to intervene, they would not have sided with the radicals.

Do preelectoral signals by a challenger guarantee postelectoral compliance? What would have been the fate of the emerging democratic institutions in Algeria had the electoral process not been aborted? Some think that the FIS would have hijacked democracy and turned Algeria into "a second Iran" by using liberal institutions as "an avenue to power, but an avenue that runs one way only."[101] Others believe that "it is by no means clear that a fundamentalist movement that comes to power through the electoral process will necessarily act in the same way as one that achieves power through a revolution (as in Iran) or a coup (as in Sudan). In addition there would have been powerful incentives for the FIS to act in a moderate and reasonable manner."[102] This question is counterfactual. Credible signals are just the first, though crucial, step in a longer (and often path-dependent) process. They alter the incentive structure of political actors and may lead to the provision of explicit guarantees. First, once moderates have embarked on the road to compromise, they will generally have the incentive to continue to play by the rules, since democratic institutions empower them vis-à-vis radical activists. Second, initial signals launch a process likely to lead to pacts, which make future noncompliance prohibitively costly. Pacts include security guarantees (such as control by former incumbents over military resources) and power-sharing arrangements (such as powerful noncompetitive presidencies or second chambers). Political actors are well aware that equal or greater force is necessary for any threat effectively to deter cheating. This point was implied by an Algerian politician, Nouredinne Boukrouh, who argued that "the FIS should be allowed to form its government and govern, but the army should be called in if the FIS violates the constitution."[103]

The Belgian experience suggests that the politicization of religion is compatible with liberal democratic development, thus undermining arguments that posit "the desacralization of politics and the depoliticization of the sacred" as necessary preconditions for democracy in Muslim countries.[104] For the Algerian sociologist Lahouari Addi, the prospect of an electoral victory by the Islamist party FIS was a potentially "fecund regression," in the sense that the (regressive) triumph of the FIS could have proven a step forward in Algeria's democratization, preparing a separation of the political and the religious spheres.[105] As in Belgium, democracy could emerge despite the initial absence of convinced democrats, as a "fortuitous by-product."[106] Still, Turkey suggests that religious challengers often face inflexible incumbents. No rea-

sonable compromise by the challengers satisfies them. The safest path to incorpora-
tion seems to require initially low electoral scores that allow young religious parties
to develop strong internal controls while in the opposition. If this analysis is true,
Jordan could be the best prospect for the incorporation of an Islamist party.

A hypothetical democracy in which powerful religious parties play a prominent
role will probably come at the price of a religious bias in the social, cultural, and
political spheres, at least initially. In Belgium this bias was reflected in guarantees
for church privileges, the preservation of the church's prominent role in education,
the dominant role of the Catholic party, the omnipresence of religious symbols, and
the institutionalized and state-supported role of the Catholic movement in every
aspect of social life.[107] Likewise, it is possible to imagine a regime in a Muslim
country that combines competitive political institutions with pronounced religious
features, democratic in political matters and Islamic in moral ones.

The outcome of the democratization process had tremendous implications for both
countries. The 1884 victory of moderate Catholics decisively reinforced Belgium's
fledgling liberal institutions. The perception that moderation and attachment to the
country's constitution paid off for the church acquired hegemonic status among
Catholics. In contrast, the failure of democratization in Algeria led to a vicious cycle
of violence. The participation of the FIS in the process of political competition had
begun a process of legitimation of the country's new democratic institutions and was
easing the integration of the Algerian Islamists into these institutions. As Burgat puts
it, FIS militants did more in a matter of months to strengthen the legitimacy of elec-
tions than Algerian "democrats" did in years.[108] The coup destroyed the party's insti-
tutionalist strategy, decapitated the moderate party leadership, and tipped the balance
in favor of its most radical and violent elements, who had consistently maintained that
democracy could never be the path to victory.[109] The failure of democratization
amounted to a proof that electoralist strategies were futile. A bitter Hachani declared
after the coup: "We are right not to believe in democracy and the Algerian constitu-
tion."[110] In turn, the Islamist rebellion reinforced the perception, held by many
Algerian secular moderates and their European counterparts, of an inherently danger-
ous and violent Islamic fundamentalism.[111] The counterintuitive nature of the com-
parison between European and non-European experiences is worth underlining. This
comparison points to a European past which tends to be forgotten in the West and
suggests that the resurgence of religion in politics is not as fundamentally removed
from the western experience as is often thought.

Conclusion

This article offers a double counterintuitive insight about the role of institutions in
processes of democratization. First, existing institutions are important. Religious

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institutions were obviously not designed to effect democratization, yet they do in ways that turn out to be significant. Second, the effect of institutions can be surprising: democratization was facilitated by a hierarchical and autocratic religious structure and hindered by a decentralized and democratic religious structure. The crucial role of religious institutions is easily overlooked in case studies or nonanalytical comparisons (for example, between Islamist parties). Comparisons that are carefully designed around analytical puzzles are useful.

Four implications follow. First, an insight from political economy can be extended to the study of democratization. Corporatist organization facilitates enforceable bargains and compromises and helps solve commitment problems. Second, consistent with an insight from the study of ethnic conflict, strong institutions allow effective in-group policing and thus reduce the threat of violent conflict.[112] Third, political context has an independent effect on political institutions. While "religious entrepreneurs" are better able to initiate collective action and hence spur intense conflict, centralized religious institutions are also likely, under the conditions specified above, to enforce compromises and promote civil peace.[113] Finally, this argument can be extended to other authoritarian movements, since the ideological rejection of liberal democracy is obviously not an exclusive feature of religious parties. Interwar Fascist movements challenged liberal democratic regimes; although they participated in the political game, once in power they destroyed democracies. This analysis suggests one reason why democratic outcomes appear to be less likely in the presence of nonreligious authoritarian challengers: their lack of links to established social institutions, such as churches and unions, able to induce a compromise guaranteeing respect for democratic institutions.[114]

NOTES

1. Religious parties are political actors who rely on appeals that incorporate and appropriate religious symbols and rituals.

2. In parliamentary systems, a parliamentary majority; in presidential systems, both the presidency and the parliament.

3. Challengers in need of allies must make concessions. Examples include France in 1981, Turkey in 1995, and India in 1998–99. As Turkey indicates, although coalition cabinets might be sufficient in restraining challengers, they still might dissatisfy incumbents, especially the military.

4. Obviously, when incumbents do not have the power (or are unwilling) to subvert the electoral outcome, then challengers can (and will) enact their program. For example, in Weimar Germany the Nazis were able to subvert the democratic regime only when a segment of incumbents colluded with them. Collusion between incumbents and challengers at the expense of democracy requires a willingness to ally with the challenger and adopt its program, as the Nationalists did in Germany.

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5.   In the context of a negotiated transition, guaranteeing submission to democratic control is analyti-
cally equivalent to guaranteeing the incumbents' postelectoral position and interests; negotiated transi-
tions tend to produce socially conservative democracies.

6.   Sudhir Kakar, *The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion, and Conflict* (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 170.

7.   Even if successful, the initial incorporation of powerful challengers into democratic institutions
does not guarantee democratic consolidation. However, without their incorporation democratization fails.

8.   I. William Zartman, "The Challenge of Democratic Alternatives in the Maghreb," in John Ruedy,
ed., *Islamism and Secularism in North Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press), p. 209.

9.   Robert Mortimer, "Islam and Multiparty Politics in Algeria," *Middle East Journal*, 45 (October
1991), 592.

10.   Jean-Jacques Lavenue, "Le FIS et la constitution algérienne," *Praxis Juridique et Religion*, 10
(March 1993), 132.

11.   This fact is hardly surprising since (free) elections are rare in the Middle East.

12.   Christian Democratic parties won such victories after they shed their religious character. Stathis N.
Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

13.   I refer to the way in which religion is organized. Here I adopt a simple distinction between central-
ized and decentralized religious institutions.

14.   In 1959 the West German Social Democratic Party convened a special party conference in the
town of Bad Godesberg at which Marxism was rejected, private ownership of the means of production
embraced, and party opposition to NATO reversed.

15.   Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 4.

16.   Mustafa Al-Ahnaf, Bernard Botiveau, and Franck Frégosi, *L'Algérie par ses islamistes* (Paris:
Karthala, 1991).

17.   Roy, p. 195; John P. Entelis, "Islam, Democracy, and the State: The Reemergence of Authoritarian
Politics in Algeria," in Ruedy, ed., p. 231.

18.   Pradeep K. Chhibber, "State Policy, Rent Seeking, and the Electoral Success of a Religious Party
in Algeria," *Journal of Politics*, 58 (February 1996), 126–48.

19.   The FIS won 55 percent of the popular vote and control of 856 of 1,541 municipalities; the FLN
won 28 percent of the popular vote.

20.   John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996), p. 150.

21.   Severine Labat, *Les islamistes Algériens: Entre les urnes et le maquis* (Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1995); Amine Touati, *Algérie, les islamistes à l'assault du pouvoir* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995); Andrew J.
Pierre and William B. Quandt, *The Algerian Crisis: Policy Options for the West* (Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 13.

22.   Labat, p. 74.

23.   Madani's 1989 book, *The Crisis of Modern Thought and the Justifications of the Islamic Solution*,
included calls for a political system based on "God's sovereignty." Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau, and Frégosi, pp.
77–87.

24.   Labat, pp. 173–75.

25.   Excerpts from articles published by Benhadj in the FIS newspaper *Al-Munquith*, as translated by
Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau, and Frégosi, pp. 87–100. Also see Abdelasiem El-Difraoui, "La critique du système
démocratique par le Front islamique du salut," in Gilles Kepel, ed., *Exils et Royaumes: Les appartenances
au monde arabo-musulman aujourd'hui* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques,
1994), pp. 105–24.

26.   Pierre van Zuylen, "La Belgique et le Vatican en 1879," *Revue Générale Belge*, 21 (1954), 1906.

27.   Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Democracy and Religious Politics: Evidence from Belgium," *Comparative
Political Studies*, 31 (June 1998), 291–319.

28. Alphonse Bellemans, *Victor Jacobs (1838–1891)* (Brussels: Albert Dewit, 1913), p. 365.

29. Camile de Hemptinne, *Questionnaire Politique No 2: Le libéralisme* (Ghent: Siffer, 1877), p. 6.

30. Arthur Verhaegen, *Catholique et Politique* (Bruges: Imprimerie Classique de Saint-Augustin, Desclée de Brouwer et Cie, 1878).

31. Prosper de Haulleville, "Vainqueurs, que ferons-nous?," *Revue Générale,* 23 (1876), 138.

32. J. D'Anethan, "Les devoirs de l'opposition," *Revue Générale,* 29 (1879), 97.

33. *Journal de Bruxelles,* Nov. 10, 1877.

34. Bellemans, p. 365.

35. Charles Woeste, *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire contemporaine de la Belgique,* vol. 1 (Brussels: Librairie Albert Dewit, 1927), p. 149.

36. *Journal de Bruxelles,* July 27, 1878.

37. Quoted in Alois Simon, *L'hypothèse libérale en Belgique: Documents inédits 1839–1907* (Wetteren: Scaldis, 1956), p. 174.

38. Verhaegen, *Catholique et Politique.*

39. Touati, p. 70.

40. Labat, pp. 147–71; Touati, p. 71; Sophie Bessis, "Les specificités de l'islamisme algérien," in Reporters sans Frontières, *Le drame Algérien: Un peuple en otage* (Paris: La Découverte, 1994), p. 197.

41. Charles Woeste, "Les progrès de l'évolution du Libéralisme Belge," *Revue Générale,* 28 (1878), 634.

42. Yahia H. Zoubir, "Stalled Democratization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Algeria," *Democratization,* 2 (Summer 1995), 129; Lavenue, p. 137; Touati, p. 71.

43. Ghazi Hidouci, *Algérie: La libération inachevée* (Paris: La Découverte, 1995), p. 267.

44. Ahmed Rouadjia, "Le FIS et l'Etat islamique," in Reporters sans Frontières, p. 202.

45. Nineteenth century Belgium was an exclusionary regime whose main political actors displayed mutual intolerance and distrust and where the masses, as well as the radical Liberal and Catholic elites, lacked a democratic culture. Class and religious conflict raged; Catholics and Liberals battled against each other in bloody street demonstrations, while workers lived in utmost misery and were violently repressed by the Belgian army at the cost of dozens of lives. Warnings that politics had become "a religious struggle" leading to "no other possible outcome than the proscription of liberalism or the destruction of the church" were commonplace. Indeed, two leading Belgian historians metaphorically describe Belgian politics during the 1870s as a "true ideological civil war." In contrast, the failure of democratization in Algeria came as a surprise. As Carlier points out, "nobody could imagine, in the summer of 1988, that Algeria could fall into the most bloody civil war of the contemporary Arab world." In fact, francophone North Africa was for a long time thought to be culturally immune to Islamism. Algeria, in particular, stands out in the Arab world because of its close ties to Europe, its more egalitarian society, and its highly literate urban population, factors that turned it into a "perfect candidate for democratization." Its early and vigorous associational life established the foundations of a robust civil society. Its political culture was marked by the legacies of the French humanist and legalist tradition in Algerian society. Finally, both Belgium and Algeria were young states under French supervision, vulnerable to foreign intervention, undergoing a process of modernization, state-building, and nation-building in a period of international democratic expansion (the first and third "waves"). Els Witte and Jan Craeybeckx, *La Belgique politique de 1830 à nos jours: Les tensions d'une démocratie bourgeoise* (Brussels: Editions Labor, 1987), pp. 100, 54; de Haulleville, p. 133; Omar Carlier, *Entre Nation et Jihad: Histoire sociale des radicalismes Algériens* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1995), pp. 9, 151–62; John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 152; Giacomo Luciani, "The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State, and Democratization," in Ghassan Salamé, ed., *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), p. 145; Rouadjia, p. 202.

46. Charles Tilly, *The Vendée* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 23.

47. Kalyvas, "Democracy and Religious Politics," pp. 291–319. A historian has termed the radical Catholic project "ultramontane fundamentalism." C. Weber, "Ultramontanismus als Katholischer

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Fundamentalismus," in W. Loth, ed., *Deutscher Katholizismus im Umbruch zur Moderne* (Stuttgart: 1991).

48.   John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East," in Salamé, ed., p. 40.

49.   Jean Leca, "Democratization in the Arab World: Uncertainty, Vulnerability and Legitimacy: A Tentative Conceptualization and Some Hypotheses," in Salamé, ed., p. 75.

50.   Steven Heydemann, "Is the Middle East Different?," *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (April 1996), 175.

51.   Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics*, 2 (April 1970), 345–53.

52.   John Waterbury, "Fortuitous By-Products," *Comparative Politics*, 29 (April 1997), 383–402.

53.   Labat, p. 220; Zoubir, p. 129.

54.   Leca, p. 76.

55.   Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market.*

56.   Zoubir, p. 117.

57.   "The same totalitarian statism and vilification of dissent (only worse) could be found elsewhere, yet change has not always come at such price—witness the case of so much of the former Soviet bloc." Robert Malley, *The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 248.

58.   Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market.*

59.   Carlier, p. 383.

60.   There was a "clear will on the part of the government to engage in democratization." Luciani, p. 147. Also see Pierre and Quandt, p. 7; and John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 250.

61.   Mohand Salah Tahi, "Algeria's Democratisation Process: A Frustrated Hope," *Third World Quarterly,* 16 (June 1995), 212. Madani even thought that the military might side with the FIS during the May 1991 strike. Touati, p. 45; Zoubir, p. 126.

62.   Mortimer, "Islam and Multiparty Politics," p. 592.

63.   Robert Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War," *Middle East Journal,* 50 (January 1996), 24.

64.   Touati, p. 225; Mortimer, "Islam and Multiparty Politics," p. 576.

65.   Touati, p. 126.

66.   Ibid.

67.   Anna Bozzo, "Strategie dell' Islam politico: Il case del Algeria," *Parolechiave*, 3 (1993), 172. Pierre and Quandt, p. 8, point out that "many Algerians breathed a sigh of relief when the military stepped in to prevent the FIS from coming to power with a large parliamentary majority."

68.   Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats," p. 19.

69.   Ibid., p. 16; Labat, p. 291.

70.   Abed Charef, *Algérie: Le grande dérapage* (Paris: L'Aube, 1994), p. 188; Touati, p. 75. Negative shifts of power within the frame of competitive institutions appear to have a moderating effect on political actors. Kalyvas, "Democracy and Religious Politics."

71.   Labat, pp. 119–24; Touati, pp. 9, 74; Charef, p. 219.

72.   Labat, p. 119.

73.   Arun Kapil, "Algeria," in Frank Tachau, ed., *Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 43.

74.   Labat, pp. 105–8.

75.   Touati, pp. 102–3.

76.   François Burgat, *L'islamisme en face* (Paris: La Découverte, 1996), pp. 158–59; Labat, p. 106.

77.   As quoted in Charef, p. 243. While many of the FIS's positions on social issues and its references

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to Islamic law and the Islamic state appear extremist in a western context, they were less so in Algeria, where Islam occupied a central place in the country's constitution. During the 1970s and 1980s the "symbiosis" of Islam and the state was reinforced. Bozzo, p. 173.

78. Charef, pp. 189, 196.

79. Kapil, p. 5; Bessis, p. 197.

80. Severine Labat, "L'islamisme: Facteur paradoxal de sécularisation et de construction d'une société civile?," Paper presented at the fifth congress of the Association Française de Science Politique, April 23–26, 1996, p. 8; Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau, and Frégosi, p. 33.

81. Carlier, pp. 370, 376; Esposito, p. 177; Zoubir, p. 120.

82. Charef, pp. 109, 195.

83. Barbara Smith, "Algeria: The Horror," *New York Review of Books*, 45 (April 1998), 28.

84. Touati, pp. 103–4.

85. Hugh Roberts, "The Algerian State and the Challenge of Democracy," *Government and Opposition*, 27 (Autumn 1992), 451; Charef, p. 243; Entelis, p. 233.

86. Smith, p. 28.

87. Touati, p. 122.

88. Esposito, p. 177; Touati, p. 123.

89. Charef, p. 254.

90. J. Vander Vorst-Zeegers, *Le "Journal de Bruxelles" de 1871 à 1884* (Leuven-Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1965), p. 237.

91. Van Zuylen, pp. 1733–37.

92. Simon, p. 277. Incumbents in Belgium were firmly opposed to a radical Catholic victory. The king, an autonomous actor within the incumbent block, was proliberal and had a high degree of influence over the (proliberal) military. Woeste recalls in his memoirs: "Liberals of all hues willingly depicted the conservative [Catholic] party as possessing subversive projects whose ultimate goal was the establishment of a powerful theocracy; they pointed to the existence of an extreme right within the party, whose secret aim was to react against public freedoms in order to impose the temporal domination of the clergy." Jean Stengers, *L'action du Roi en Belgique depuis 1831: Pouvoir et influence* (Paris: Duculot, 1992), pp. 89–105; Woeste, *Mémoires,* pp. 61, 78.

93. Woeste, *Mémoires,* p. 160.

94. What about the varying strength of the two mass movements? The Islamist movement in Algeria was stronger than its counterpart in Belgium and hence less amenable to control by the moderate leadership. However, it is not clear that the ultramontane movement in Belgium was weaker than the Islamist movement in Algeria relative to their respective parties. Moreover, the experience of social democratic parties suggests that moderate leaders are able to impose their decisions even on extremely powerful mass movements. Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (New York: Free Press, 1962).

95. Jean-Claude Vatin, "Revival in the Maghreb: Islam as Alternative Political Language," in Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, ed., *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 237.

96. Ahmed Rouadjia, *Les frères et la mosquée: Enquête sur le mouvement islamiste en Algérie* (Paris: Karthala, 1990).

97. Malley, p. 241; Severine Labat, "L'université Emir Abd El Kader de Constantine: L'islamisation sous contrôle," in Reporters sans Frontières, p. 87.

98. In addition, the Belgian Catholic church provided alternative options to rank-and-file radicals; it channeled them into the labor movement, a decision that eventually led to the development of the strongest Catholic labor movement in Europe.

99. Kalyvas, "Democracy and Religious Politics."

100. Esposito, p. 152; Roy, pp. 36–37.

101. Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview," *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (April 1996), 54.

102.   Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul," *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (April 1996), 9.
103.   Charef, pp. 246–47. Obviously, the military prefers to intervene before.
104.   Zoubir, p. 135.
105.   Lahouari Addi, *L'Algérie et la démocratie: Pouvoir et crise du politique dans l'Algérie contempo-raine* (Paris: La Découverte, 1994), pp. 188–95.
106.   Waterbury, "Fortuitous By-Products."
107.   "Some accuse the Catholic party of mixing religion to all its manifestations. But would it not be a supreme inconsequence for the believers not to assert publicly their Christian faith?" Bellemans, pp. 724–75.
108.   Burgat, p. 233.
109.   Charef, p. 516.
110.   As quoted in Lavenue, p. 129.
111.   Still, many leaders of the Islamist guerrillas have never been FIS activists. Luis Martinez, *La guerre civile en Algérie* (Paris: Karthala, 1998).
112.   James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review*, 90 (December 1996), 715–35.
113.   David D. Laitin, "Language Conflict and Violence," unpublished paper, University of Chicago, 1999.
114.   As pointed out above, there exists a structure of political competition such that authoritarian chal-lengers may be able to accede to power through collusion with some incumbents. In this case, there obvi-ously arises no commitment problem.

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