research, the *Volksgeschichte* school attracted young historians who, disappointed by the state, turned to study of "the people" as a more reliable source of historical continuity. To this end they introduced statistical and demographic methods and other innovations into historical research. This was intellectually more attractive than following the common paths of mainstream political history. Later, of course, the social romanticism of this concept of "the people" later turned into a racist conception under the influence of National Socialism.

For example, the research methods of *Volksgeschichte* were used in 1939 when the Nazis began planning large forced migrations in Eastern Central Europe, with the aim of ethnic cleansing. Two of the historians involved were Conze and Schieder. Their plans for such population shifts were couched in an anti-Semitic language that seems to blur any difference between forced deportation and physical annihilation. This part of the story has been told by the journalist and historian Götz Aly and others, who unearthed a series of shocking quotations that jarred with the existing image of Conze and Schieder. Many of these quotations came from unpublished memoranda found in archives, though hints of their views could also be found in their publications.

Reactions to these discoveries varied. For Götz Aly, the demographic strategies Conze and Schieder proposed are intermediary steps to the Holocaust. Aly's critics see him as a muckraker pulling quotations out of context, without analyzing the character, function, and institutional background of their sources or their real effects on the bureaucratic decision-making processes. In fact, they say, we still know very little about the interactions between *Volksgeschichte*, National Socialist ideology, and the planning and decision-making processes of World War II. While these rebuttals may damage Aly's interpretational framework, they leave the power of his telling quotations untouched. In an effort to reconcile these quotations with Conze's and Schieder's postwar work it has been argued that the two should be credited with having undergone a "learning process." This has raised the objection that a true learning process would have broken the silence both Conze and Schieder preserved with regard to their past. For some in this controversy, silence is the real scandal.

And some of the more accusatory younger historians use the scandal to implicate the Bielefeld School in this silence. Did Conze and Schieder enter into a conspiracy of silence with their students? Did their students press them hard enough with questions about their past, or shy away for their own reasons? Why have these stories come to light only now? From lack of active interest, or fear of what one might find?

Ultimately, these overlapping conflicts of interpretation, generation, and schools of thought raise the deeper question: Are intellectual and moral achievements naturally linked? ◆

—Michael Becker

Sources: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "In den Fußstapfen der Kämpfenden Wissenschaft" [In the footprints of a warring discipline], *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* January 4, 1999.

Jürgen Kocka, "Die Zukunft hat erst begonnen" [The future's just begun], in Paul Nolte, ed., *Perspektiven der Gesellschaftsgeschichte,* München, 1999.

The Greek Civil War in Retrospect

The Greek civil war, one of the three major contemporary European civil wars (along with the Spanish and Russian ones), was fought on and off between 1943 and 1949. It began during the joint German-Italian-Bulgarian occupation of the country following Greece's defeat in 1941. As the occupation shattered old structures and loyalties, a powerful Communist-controlled resistance movement emerged: EAM (the Greek acronym for National Liberation Front). In 1943, EAM eliminated almost all non-Communist resistance movements. The same year, the occupation authorities formed a collaborationist army, generically known as "Security Battalions." In 1944, fighting between ELAS (EAM's partisan army, the National Popular Liberation Army), and the Security Battalions evolved into a full-fledged civil war that created thousands of victims and long-lasting hatreds—along with the political identities that still inform Greek politics. Following the Germans' departure in October 1944, the entire country with the exception of Athens came under EAM control. In mass reprisals, the partisans massacred thousands of Security Battalionists.

When the government-in-exile, supported by Britain, returned to Athens and established its authority, a wave of bloody retaliation against EAM members, often led by former Security Battalionists, took place. Eventually, right-wing and left-wing irregular bands fought each other (with civilians being the primary target) in 1945 and 1946. In 1947, the Communist Party decided to fight an all-out war which lasted until 1949 and is often referred to as "the Greek civil war." The implementation of the Truman Doctrine, the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to enter the fray, and the Tito-Stalin fallout all contributed to the ultimate and total defeat of the Communist Party, which was to remain outlawed until 1974. Thousands of its supporters left Greece for the Soviet bloc in the wake of the defeat—a sizeable part of them ending up a far as Uzbekistan. Suspected Communist sympathizers were harassed and discriminated against. Overall, about 600,000 Greeks died of various causes between 1940 and 1949—in a country populated by less than seven million. Hundreds of thousands became refugees.

The historical literature that emerged right after the end of the civil war was consistent with the adage that history is written by the winners. The main thesis was that EAM was no more than a cover used by the Communists to win power either peacefully, or, if this proved impossible, violently. Terror was widely used by EAM, and its dominant position within the Greek resistance was the result of the systematic destruction of nationalist resistance organizations. In such circumstances collaboration with the occupiers could be excused since the prospect of long-term communism was a bigger threat than short-term fascist occupation. Having failed to win power in 1944, the Communist Party then planned a new insurrection in 1947, helped by the Soviet Union and its satellites—in partial exchange for which it accepted the country's

partition through the transfer of Greek Macedonia to Greece's northern neighbors.

Most of the work produced during this period took the form of popular pamphlets, rich in references to the violence and the "un-Greekness" of the Left, but rather short on facts. The emphasis was placed more on the last phase of the civil war than on the period of the occupation. The most useful part of this otherwise forgettable production are memoirs published by prominent military leaders of the government army and a series of publications of military history published by the Historical Service of the army. For years, the basic source on the period of occupation remained the memoirs of the British agents who worked with the partisans. During this period historical works sympathetic to the Left were only published outside Greece.

The political liberalization of the 1960s was eventually reflected in the historiography of the Civil War. The first left-wing interpretations began to appear in Greece. The main lines of the leftist thesis (which, of course, comes in many versions) can be summarized as follows: EAM was a broad-based, mostly non-communist mass movement, which expressed the popular aspirations for liberation from foreign occupation and a more just social order. EAM would have come to power by peaceful means had it not been stopped by the British who supported the local oligarchy and sponsored mass violence against it. Forced by the British to resort to arms in December 1944 and 1947, this popular movement lost only because of foreign (British and, then, US) intervention. Those who fought against Nazi Germany were executed or languished in prisons while former collaborationists became part of the postwar power establishment.

After a seven-year hiatus due to the military dictatorship (1967-1974), this literature all but erased former right-wing interpretations. A Greek-American journalist, Nicholas Gage, who visited Greece in 1977, describes a situation in which "posters, movies, books, popular songs and the youth organizations in the universities were united in celebrating the guerrillas of the civil war as heroes. It seemed that the best talents of Greece were busy rewriting the history of the war." When the same journalist published an autobiographical book in the early 1980s about the execution of his mother by the Communist guerillas in 1948, the intellectual establishment and the majority of the media reacted in a vociferously negative way; and when the Hollywood filmed version of the book was released soon after, the Communist youth organization picketed movie theaters and harassed moviegoers. Around the same time, when the renowned Greek philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis voiced a public criticism of leftist interpretations of the civil war (he deemed them Stalinist), he was openly and vehemently insulted in the first page of the Athens newspaper with the highest circulation. The victory of the Socialist party (PASOK) in 1981 turned this version of the civil war into state orthodoxy much along the same lines that the right had with its own in the 1950s. Following the long-awaited official recognition of EAM as a resistance organization in 1982 (in the context of a highly emotional debate in the National Assembly during which the opposition center-right New Democracy party walked out in protest), the left-wing version of the civil war became a staple of official discourse and schoolbooks.

Contrary to expectation, the end of the Cold War has hardly altered this situation. The last months of 1997 saw the successive (and commercially successful) publication of a significant number of historical books, heavily biased in favor of the Left. A climate of ideological suspicion prevails. For instance, a Greek journalist writing a book review in 1998 quipped that the political orientation of the authors of books on the civil war can be "sensed immediately and with certainty." Moreover, serious historical research has been impeded by the sad state of the Greek archives, the non-availability of the largest part of the archives of the Communist Party, and one of the most outrageous acts of destruction of a country's collective memory: the burning of millions of personal files (held by the police) and related state documents concerning both the civil war and the postwar period in celebratory bonfires all over the country during the summer of 1989. The intention was to celebrate the "national reconciliation" and the "true end of the civil war" on the occasion of the formation of an extraordinary coalition cabinet which included the Greek right and a leftist coalition containing the Communist party!

Yet despite these obstacles, a revisionist trend is slowly (and still timidly) emerging. Recent work focuses more on the period of the occupation, takes into account social and economic factors, adopts a view "from the ground up" with a strong local bent, places Greek history in a wider comparative perspective, and relies on unconventional material to make up for the absence of archival sources, such as oral history, local studies, personal memoirs. What emerges is a very complex and nuanced set of shifting and segmented loyalties, heavily informed by local considerations and conflicts, in which terror was never the monopoly of a single camp. In addition, new groundbreaking work examines the civil war in Macedonia, which appears to have been an exceedingly complex conflict blending ethnic and ideological conflict with such diverse participants as Slavophone Macedonians, Greek Macedonian Turkophone refugees from Asia Minor, Greek Macedonian refugees from Bulgaria and the Caucasus, and various groups of transient nomads—all speaking different dialects and languages. We still know little about the multifaceted aspects of this conflict in which identities were so fluid. For example, a Slavophone peasant of Macedonia could be a self-professed Bulgarian *komitadji* collaborating with the German occupation authorities, a member of the Slavophone guerrillas of ELAS, a member of Tito's Macedonian partisans, or a right-wing Greek nationalist. The first findings to come out of this literature undermine the perception of the civil war as a conflict between two well-defined and entrenched ideological camps. In Greece, as elsewhere, a sensible understanding of civil war only seems to emerge when its passions have subsided. ◆

—Stathis N. Kalyvas

Sources: Mark Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece: the Experience of Occupation, 1941-44*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.

Giorgios Margaritis, *Apo tin itta stin exegersi: Ellada, anixi 1941-fthinoporo 1942 [From defeat to insurrection: Greece, spring 1941-fall 1942]*, Athens, Politis, 1993.