

The European Center-Right at the End of the Twentieth Century

Edited by Frank L. Wilson

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CHAPTER FOUR

The Greek Right: Between Transition and Reform

Stathis N. Kalyvas

New Democracy (*Nea Dimokratia*—ND) emerged as the dominant Greek right-wing party immediately after the transition of the country to democracy in 1974. Although challenged by extreme right-wing parties, as well as by splinter parties, ND has managed to uphold its hegemony of the center-right political space in a way unmatched by most European conservative parties. However, it has failed to translate this hegemony into broader political domination. In fact, the ambiguity of its achievements is impressive: its success in reinventing itself while building and dominating the new democratic regime after 1974, stands in striking contrast to its dismal performance after 1981. ND was continually in power from 1974 to 1981 but has remained in opposition for 12 out of the last 15 years. After its defeat in the 1996 elections, ND is entering a period of 4 more years out of power. Its predicament exemplifies a problem faced by a number of conservative parties across the world, which have had their economic and political agenda taken over by center-left parties.

The evolution of ND raises some interesting theoretical issues. In just 22 years, ND experienced an unusually diverse organizational trajectory, in many respects a condensed equivalent of the organizational development of Western European parties during the entire century. ND underwent several major organizational mutations, evolving from an elite (or cadre) party to one with successively pronounced mass, catch-all, and now cartel characteristics. Surveying this organizational trajectory is essential in explaining the way in which changing patterns of party competition affect

the form of party organization. Finally, the overlap of democratic transition and consolidation processes with the emergence and evolution of ND allows the examination of the interaction between democratization and party development.

Historical Background

The Greek party system is defined by the presence of cleavages with deep historical roots in two civil conflicts. The first one, known as National Schism, began during World War I over the issue of Greece's participation in the war. It evolved during the interwar period into a conflict between republicans and royalists. The republican camp, also known as *venizelist* (from the name of its leader Eleftherios Venizelos), was dominated by the Liberal party, while the royalist camp (the *antivenizelists*) was dominated by the People's party. The second conflict is the Civil War (1946–1949) between the pro-western bourgeois parties and the communist-dominated left. Although the venizelist political establishment sided with the royalists, significant venizelist popular segments fought with the communists. During the 1960s, the attempt by the king to obstruct the exercise of power by the venizelist Center Union provoked a major political crisis that reactivated the old royalist-republican cleavage and paved the way for the 1967 military coup.

The succession and superimposition of these two historical cleavages have produced a lasting division in three political families: The right, the center, and the left as they were called in the postwar period.¹ The communist and postcommunist left is presently represented by the Communist party and the leftist coalition. The center-left is dominated by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), founded in 1974 by Andreas Papandreu and led since 1996 by the present prime minister, Kostas Simitis. Although created as a totally new party seeking to fill the until-then empty socialist slot, PASOK successfully appropriated the venizelist tradition. It has been continually in power since 1981, with the exception of a brief spell in 1989–93 (see table 4.1).

New Democracy has a long and clear partisan lineage. It follows on the steps of the interwar People's party, and the postwar Greek Rally (founded in 1952) and National Radical Union (ERE—founded in 1956). This continuity is expressed in terms of both electoral support and political personnel—most strikingly in the person of Konstantinos Karamanlis. Having founded and led ERE, Karamanlis went on to found ND in the wake of the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1974. ND is presently headed by Karamanlis' nephew, Kostas Karamanlis, the party's sixth leader.

Table 4.1 Election Results, 1974–1994 (in percentage of votes cast)

	1974	1977	1981	1981	1981*	1984*	1985	June 1989	Nov 1989	1990	1993	1994*	1996
ND	54.4	41.8	35.9	31.3	38.0	40.8	44.3	40.4	46.2	46.9	39.3	32.7	38.1
Other Right	1.3	7.9	1.7	2.8	2.6	0.6	1.3	3.1		0.8	5.0	10.0	2.9
Center	20.8	12.0	1.6	7.6	2.0	0.3	0.5	1.2	0.1				
Greens							0.1	2.6	0.9	1.1	0.2		
PASOK	13.6	25.3	48.1	40.1	41.6	45.8	39.1	36.0	40.8	39.4	46.9	37.7	41.5
Communists/ Left Coalition	9.5	12.1	12.3	12.2	15.1	11.7	13.1	14.3	11.0	10.5	7.4	12.6	10.7
Other Left		0.5	0.2		0.7	0.4	1.0	2.4	0.4	0.4	0.2		4.4
Other	0.4	0.4	0.2		0.4	0.6		0.6	0.9	1.0		5.6	2.28

Note: *Elections to the European parliament

Despite the party system's tripolar structure, competition has been bipolar between the ND and PASOK. The two parties have overwhelmingly dominated both the party system at large and their own respective political space, as shown in table 4.2.

Electoral Support and Social Basis

Greece ranks last in the structural determination of the vote according to a 16-country study. It is also the only Western European country where ideological party cleavages are more powerful predictors of voting than structural ones.² A recent electoral study confirms these findings and shows that contrary to the other Southern European countries, the main predictor of Greek voting behavior is not class or religiosity but ideology in the sense of the voters' positioning on the left-right axis.³ The ideological cleavage in Greek politics reflects partisan identities largely shaped by the legacy of past civil conflicts. Still, a number of variables, such as socioeconomic status, urban vs. rural lifestyle, and age have a limited impact and allow us to track the evolution of some general trends. Most significant is the modernization of the social basis of ND toward a younger, better educated, more urban profile from 1981 to 1989 and the gradual reversal of this trend after 1993.

Historically, the Greek right has tended to rely on rural support.⁴ In 1963, ERE won 12.8 percent more votes in rural areas than in urban ones, a feature inherited by ND. However, the rural component of the right-wing vote declined steadily between 1981 and 1993: In 1981 ND was stronger in rural areas (+8.6 percent), but in 1985 this difference had shrunk to 3.7 and in 1989 to 2.5. Interestingly, PASOK followed the

opposite path: Whereas in 1981 it won more votes in urban areas (+4.3 percent), in 1985 its support was almost uniform (+0.9 in urban areas), and in 1989 the balance was reversed (+5.2% in rural areas). Class became a somewhat sharper determinant of the vote in 1985 with significant segments of the middle and upper socioeconomic groups deserting PASOK for ND.⁵ Parallel to this trend was the rising attractiveness of ND among the more educated and younger segments of Greek society. This development is even more striking if contrasted with the notorious difficulty of ND in attracting support from younger voters. In 1977, for instance, age differentiated more than any other demographic factor the voters of the two major parties.⁶ In sum, ND largely succeeded during the 1980s to "modernize" its social basis.

However, this trend is currently being reversed. PASOK's right shift after 1993, and especially the 1996 election of the modernizer Kostas Simitis at its head had a significant impact on the social basis of both parties. Significant middle and upper income groups (such as professionals and educated private-sector workers) shifted their support away from ND and toward PASOK.⁷ In the process, ND became markedly less "modern": the rural component of its vote climbed back to +3.6 in 1993 and +5.3 in 1996 (as opposed to PASOK's +2.5 and +3.4 respectively). Likewise, whereas older voters (60 years and up) were in 1996 6.8 percent more likely to vote for ND than for PASOK, younger ones (18–29 years), were 4.1 percent more likely to vote for PASOK. The social segments in which ND fared well in 1996 included the older and better educated homemakers, the better educated retirees, and the farmers (respectively 19.5, 11.4, and 7.8 percent more likely to vote for ND than PASOK). ND did poorly among public-sector workers (irrespective of education level) and the less educated workers and retirees of the private-sector.⁸ In fact, whereas 40 percent of party representatives in the 1996 PASOK congress were public-sector employees, only 13 percent of party representatives in the 1997 ND congress were employed in the public-sector.

Party Organization

Throughout its existence, New Democracy has been a hybrid party in terms of organization: the clientelistic features of an elite party coexist with key elements of a mass party—membership size, use of mass mobilization, and the role of organization in creating and representing a collective identity. Likewise, catch-all party features such as membership heterogeneity, focus on policy and social amelioration rather than societal change, low emphasis on members' obligations, and power differential between leadership and party cadres, coexist with cartel party features such

Table 4.2 ND and PASOK Domination: 1981–1993 National Elections

<i>Election</i>	<i>Votes Polled by ND and PASOK</i>	<i>ND Share of the Right Vote (%)</i>	<i>PASOK Share of Center-Left Vote (%)</i>
1974	168.0	98.3	39.5
1977	167.1	84.1	67.8
1981	183.9	95.4	96.7
1985	186.6	98.5	99.3
June 1989	183.4	97.1	96.5
November 1989	186.8	100.0	97.6
April 1990	185.5	98.3	97.2
1993	186.2	88.7	99.5
1996	179.8	92.9	90.4

as state connections, growing professionalization, and a view of political competition as a matter of efficient and skilled management.⁹

The organizational hybridity of ND points to the inadequacy of the classification tools. True, party types are ideal types, "heuristically convenient polar types, to which individual parties may approximate more or less closely."¹⁰ Still, the very exercise of classification is ultimately futile because it is based on a perception of parties as snapshots rather than dynamically evolving organizations. What is needed instead is a more dynamic (hence contextual and historical) understanding of a party's trajectory. Below, I survey the origin and development of ND using an analytical framework that relies on simple rational choice assumptions combined with a historical/contextual analysis.

ND is distinguished by two surprising organizational features. First, it is the European conservative party with the second most encapsulating organization. In 1996, ND claimed 383,428 members distributed across 3,500 local branches. This is the official number of participants in the 1996 party elections—most probably an inflated number. Table 4.3 provides data on the evolution of the party's membership over the last 20 years. This membership corresponds to a ratio of party members to party voters (M/V) of 14.53, and a ratio of party members to the electorate (M/E) of 4.46. These numbers place ND in a higher position than the Belgian, German, Italian (before their demise) and Dutch Christian Democrats, and the Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and British Conservatives. Only the Austrian Conservatives have a higher M/E ratio (see table 4.4).

The second feature worth noticing is the representativeness of ND's organization. According to a recent comparative study, ND is the European party (across all party families) most representative of its electorate. Based on Eurobarometer data, ND ranks first in terms of gender, age, and class representativeness of its electorate.¹¹

Both features are surprising, cross-nationally as well as longitudinally. Center-right parties (particularly non-Christian Democratic ones) tend to be weak in terms of mass organization and representativeness. In fact, ND is the only representative conservative party.¹² Moreover, Greek parties, while relying on powerful collective identities, have traditionally been personalistic and clientelistic, shunning formal, and even more, mass organization. Indeed, Karamanlis established ND singlehandedly in 1974 without prior consultations with the legitimate ERE leadership.¹³ Most telling is the fact that the official symbol of the party up to 1979 was Karamanlis' picture.

The military dictatorship had a profoundly modernizing impact on Greek parties—albeit a gradual one. Charismatic leadership was a feature of both ND and PASOK: Karamanlis and Papandreou were both charismatic

Table 4.3 ND Membership Figures

Year	Membership	Local Organizations
1976 ^a	20,000	40
1977 ^c	20,000	233
1978 ^b	100,000	missing data
1979 ^a	150,000	missing data
1981 ^a	missing data	580
1983 ^a	220,000	2,000
1987 ^a	400,000	3,500
1991 ^a	400,000	3,500
1996 ^d	383,428	3,500

Sources: ^aofficial party figures (cited in Pappas 1995; Clogg 1985)

^bKatsoudas 1987

^cofficial party figures (cited in Loulis 1981)

^dofficial party figures (cited in *To Vima*, March 24, 1996)

Table 4.4 Ratio of Party Members to the Electorate (M/E)—Selected Countries

CDA (Netherlands)	1.10 (1989)
CDU (Germany)	1.56 (1987)
Conservatives (UK)	2.32 (1987)
CSU (Germany)	0.41 (1987)
DC (Italy)	3.97 (1987)
M (Sweden)	1.27 (1988)
ND (Greece)	4.46 (1993)
ÖVP (Austria)	9.40 (1990)
PSC/CVP (Belgium)	2.59 (1987)

Source: Katz et al. (1992), except Greece.

personalities who founded and dominated their parties. But these parties survived and eventually transcended the advent of their charismatic founders. They introduced formal rules regulating their activities, built a mass structure, and democratized to a considerable extent their organizations. PASOK was the first noncommunist Greek party to introduce large-scale mass organization, but was able to reform its internal organization and escape from the autocratic embrace of its founder only after Papandreou's death in 1996. ND's initial attempts to build a modern party organization were only moderately successful, but the party survived successfully five leadership changes after Karamanlis moved to the presidency in 1980.¹⁴ The

party organized a first congress in 1979 and built an impressive mass organization after 1981.

New Democracy's organizational development followed four distinct phases. In a first phase (1974–1979), the party leadership set out to create a national organization with regional and local branches. However, the party emphasized the articulation of a modern ideological message rather than the recruitment of members and the development of a grassroots organization. Indeed, membership remained very low and the party was run by its leader with traditional notables in control of the regional level. As the party's general director acknowledged in 1977: "During this first organizational period, the leader . . . instructed and supervised the party organs, determined their membership, their activities, their sector of responsibility, their ways and methods of action."¹⁵

In a second phase (1977–1981), the party leadership made vigorous efforts to institutionalize its organization and develop a mass structure. A preliminary congress took place in 1977, the first opportunity for members of a Greek conservative party to participate in party proceedings, and in 1979 the party convened its first congress. At the same time, a well advertised membership drive was launched under the slogan "you are a friend; become a member." As a result membership climbed from 20,000 in 1977 to 150,000 in 1979.¹⁶ Still, the development of party organization was slow: "The party was far less significant as a mass organization than as a group of leaders and professional politicians."¹⁷ Party "members" were often indistinguishable from the personal clienteles of party potentates.

In a third phase (1981–1989), the party carried out a process of "structural modernization"¹⁸ by building an impressive mass organization and succeeded in beating PASOK at its own game. Membership swelled, reaching a stunning 400,000 members; the party created powerful youth, student, and professional organizations. Strikingly for a non-Christian Democratic party, it set up party branches in trade unions. It mobilized tens of thousands of supporters, both during elections and in between for a variety of activities, ranging from canvassing and poster-plastering to participation in demonstrations and mass rallies. In short, during this period the party adopted many of the mass party's features—a development consistent with Maurice Duverger's hypothesis of "a contagion from the left" according to which all parties are forced to become mass parties in order to compete with the left.¹⁹ However, ND never became an ideal-typical mass party. While "active participation of members grew sharply," the party was still dominated by its leadership.²⁰ Still, the emphasis ND placed on mass mobilization and the central role afforded by a historically grounded collective identity differentiated it from catch-all parties and gave it a definite mass profile.

Finally, since 1989 the party has been experiencing organizational decline coupled with a limited democratization of its organization. On the one hand, ND is quickly shedding mass mobilization, replacing it with professional teams running media-oriented electoral campaigns. On the other hand, the declining party membership is offered new opportunities for participation: Members' representatives were included for the first time in 1993 in the electoral college which elected the party president, while the present leader was elected by the party congress.²¹

In short, ND's 22-year organizational trajectory represents in a much condensed form the trajectory of many West European parties, a process which took place in the span of over a century. Interestingly, this accelerated organizational trajectory mirrors the process of Greece's transition from an agrarian to a service economy in just 30 years. Such processes are bound to produce outcomes that parallel the models they emulate, but diverge from them in significant ways.

Below, I explain party development by focusing on the way political competition shapes the incentives and strategies of party elites and party sympathizers. I rely on simple rational choice assumptions: On the one hand, party elites seek reelection. In a parliamentary system with strongly disciplined parties, an electoral system favoring the winner, and pronounced clientelistic features, this is equivalent to seeking the party's victory. On the other hand, party sympathizers seek to maximize the benefits derived from their participation in politics. These benefits take the form of selective incentives (both material and symbolic) which, if exceeding the cost of active participation, solve the collective action problem by making party membership an attractive option. This framework also stresses agency. Party organization is the outcome of choices made by party elites and sympathizers in response to changes in the structure of political competition rather than the result of impersonal structural forces. In turn, these choices are constrained by various political and institutional factors but in ways that leave room for choice. As indicated by table 4.5, predictions diverge slightly from actual outcomes. As a result, I supplement this framework with a contextual analysis. Two factors, in particular, turn out to be significant: The transition to democracy and the legacy of past choices.

Explaining the Organizational Trajectory

In July 1974, New Democracy's founder and leader, Konstantinos Karamanlis steered the country to democracy. The elections that followed reflected this particular circumstance: ND won an unprecedented 54 percent of the votes against divided opponents (the Center Union and PASOK)

Table 4.5 Political Competition and Party Organization

<i>Features of Political Competition</i>	<i>Incentives of Party Elites</i>	<i>Incentives of Sympathizers</i>	<i>Predicted Outcome</i>	<i>Actual Outcome</i>
ND domination (1974-1977)	Restriction of party resources/elite politics	Personal clientelistic ties	Personalistic party; no formal rules	Introduction of formal rules
Erosion of ND domination; rise of a mass-organized challenger (1977-1981)	Limited opening to outside groups	Limited participation	Institutionalization of party organization; limited member recruitment	Institutionalization of party organization; limited member recruitment
Defeat; loss of state resources (1981-1989)	Decisive opening to outside groups	Active participation	Active member recruitment; mass organization	Active member recruitment; mass organization
Alternation in power/new media landscape (1989-now)	Liquidation of mass organization	Gradual Atonization	Decline of party organization; professionalization	Slight decline of party organization; professionalization; democratization

and assumed full control of the state. Party elites had no incentive to create a formal or mass party structure. Such organizations are costly and time-consuming to build, while they restrict the freedom of action of party elites by creating a competing political class of party cadres.²² Even if a formal party structure was in place, party sympathizers would have lacked the incentive to join, since they prefer instead to maintain individual clientelistic links with party notables. The prediction that follows is that neither formal nor mass organization would emerge. However, while no mass organization was built during this time, the party leadership began a concerted and sustained effort to create a formal party structure that amounted to a "voluntary, yet carefully controlled, transfer of intra-party power from the top to the base."²³ This development is even more puzzling because it was the charismatic leader himself who pushed for formal party organization.

The paradox of a charismatic party leader creating a formal party structure can be unraveled once a contextual factor, the transition to democracy, is integrated into the analysis. The transition to democracy affected the preferences of the party leadership and provided an incentive for the modernization of the right. Karamanlis' ambition to create a "modern" party of the right, distinguishable from the pre-1967 ERE in terms of organizational and ideological outlook, proved a powerful motor of reform. In pushing for the creation of party organization, Karamanlis was motivated primarily by his objective to consolidate Greek democracy.²⁴ As he pointed out in his 1974 founding declaration of ND, "it will be necessary . . . to rally people into powerful political formations able to protect democracy not only from communism and fascism, but also from the causes that occasioned its downfall."²⁵ Likewise, Karamanlis was convinced that powerful and enduring parties had to be democratically organized so as to be independent of their leader's fate.²⁶ It is important to emphasize here that the impact of democratic consolidation on party development is contingent of political competition: Karamanlis could indulge in his endeavor only because his party dominated Greek politics. A higher level of competition might have prohibited him from concentrating on the development of formal party institutions. The case of ND is, thus, significant from a theoretical point of view. While we begin to understand the role of political parties in processes of consolidation, the question of how consolidation processes affect party development remains largely unexplored.²⁷

Since party institutionalization was geared toward democratic consolidation rather than party competition, the new formal institutions remained inactive. Predictably, parliamentarians opposed the expansion of local party organization "in the hope of retaining personal control over contacts with prospective voters."²⁸ Likewise, the party's administrative committee,

which was composed exclusively of nonparliamentarians, was ignored by Karamanlis, who ran the party with his own staff.²⁹ Finally, while the party introduced new personnel in Greek politics (out of 220 deputies elected in 1974, 127 ran for the first time), it was immediately dominated by unreformed notables of the old ERE.³⁰

In 1977 the political landscape began to change. Democracy appeared stable, hence consolidation was exhausted as an incentive for party institutionalization. Moreover, the pattern of political competition changed. Even before the November 1977 elections, it became clear that the dominant position enjoyed by ND could no longer be taken for granted. ND won these elections but suffered extensive losses (a drop of 12.5 percentage points), both to its right (the extreme-right made substantial inroads into ND's electorate) and to its left. PASOK, supported by its mass organization, emerged as the main opposition party and a powerful challenger, a development that "panicked" the leadership of ND.³¹ Finally, the anticipation of Karamanlis' retirement in the context of the mounting PASOK challenge raised the pressure for the institutionalization of party organization.

The renewal of the party's efforts to develop a formal organization during this period can be explained by this shift in political competition.³² The expansion of regional and local party branches, the initiation of a drive toward mass organization-building, the organization of the first party congress and, ultimately, the successful replacement of Karamanlis through formal procedures rather than obscure backroom deals, as was often the case in the past, were all expressions of this effort. Membership benefits for party sympathizers remained quite low compared to the costs they faced, but were higher than in the previous period. A party apparatus was now in place, providing the most committed sympathizers with incentives for participation—even professional opportunities as party cadres. The party leadership encouraged member participation.³³ As a result, party cadres began to demand openly that the party "get rid of the hitherto absolute dominance of its elites, that is, of what has been characteristically called *deputocracy*."³⁴ Still, these inroads were limited. The 1979 party congress reinforced the role of the parliamentary group within the party, while local and regional organizations were, as a party memorandum noted, "not representative, lack[ing] quality, and hence competence to carry out the party organization, as well as to mobilize the voters for the forthcoming election campaign."³⁵

Many observers expected that ND would not survive Karamanlis' 1980 departure from the party he founded to the presidency of the republic. They also speculated that the party might not be able to withstand the shock of its 1981 electoral defeat and the ensuing internal fighting.³⁶ These

observers were extrapolating from past history: Events such as the departure of charismatic leaders, crucial electoral defeats, and open internal infighting (not to mention the electoral victory of a leftist party), constituted extraordinary circumstances in the context of Greek politics that, in the past, had affected the political system in profound and disruptive ways. That ND overcame these obstacles and survived as a party, is testimony to its successful institutionalization—a result of the organizational strategy followed after 1974.

The 1981 crushing defeat of ND came as a shock to party leaders and sympathizers alike. Accustomed to long and uninterrupted periods in power, they were now deprived of their main resource, the state. Karamanlis' successor, the moderate George Rallis, was blamed for the defeat and replaced (through formal procedures of the parliamentary group) by the hard-liner Evangelos Averoff. The new party leadership set out to fight PASOK with its own weapons. Despite an initially old-fashioned discourse suggesting that the party was retrogressing "in both ideological and organizational terms,"³⁷ this period marked the beginning of a remarkable overhaul. The party succeeded in building a formidable mass organization. The prior empty party shell was filled by the expansion of party branches, the creation of ancillary organizations, and the active recruitment of members. Party membership swelled, eventually reaching twice the size of PASOK's. The party gave special emphasis to its youth organization (ONNED) and its professional branches.³⁸ Elections in professional associations and unions (from high school students to legal and medical doctors associations) became bitterly contested along partisan lines and their outcome commanded broad attention and carried substantial political relevance. The result was a rise in political polarization and the wholesale politicization of Greek society.³⁹

The decision to build a mass organization can be explained as an effect of the 1981 defeat on the incentives of both party elite and sympathizers. The party lost its state-related resources while having to face mass mobilization, a mode of political competition promoted and mastered by PASOK. Hence, it made sense to undergo the substantial costs and risks of mass organization-building. The evolution of the party is indeed compatible with Duverger's "contagion of the left" hypothesis, but only in the limited sense that it represented the outcome of a particular configuration of political competition, rather than some universalistic wave of the future. Personal connections to party notables lost a great part of their significance for party sympathizers because these notables could no longer provide benefits. However, this development alone would have only produced a growing disaffection from politics on the part of sympathizers rather than an incentive to join the party as members, an act of

more intense participation. In any case, the expectation of clientelistic benefits did not disappear since the party was expected to return to power, sooner or later. Moreover, the idea of political activism was foreign, even suspect, to the conservative ND electorate, since it was perceived as behavior only fit for leftists. Why, then, did sympathizers join the party? To a great extent, it was PASOK's behavior in power that raised the participation incentives of ND sympathizers. Not only did these sympathizers lose their privileged access to the state, they also discovered that the state itself turned against them. Indeed, PASOK's actions in power appeared vindictive to many. Together with inflamed rhetorical attacks against the right, constantly pounded by the government-controlled electronic media, the new government sent negative signals about its impartiality. For instance, public-sector employees who were known ND sympathizers felt threatened by the imposition of politically motivated professional sanctions. Furthermore, party membership offered an important symbolic benefit for a substantial segment of ND sympathizers—a sense of belonging and a confirmation of their identity at a time when their traditional references were lost and their identity challenged. The party complemented symbolic incentives with material ones. Party branches began to organize a variety of popular nonpolitical activities (such as community events, excursions, dances, festivals), and offer a wide range of services, going as far as helping members find employment in the private sector. The outcome of the 1984 European elections intensified the transformation of sympathizers into members by demonstrating beyond any doubt that the PASOK government was not a fleeting phenomenon but a lasting reality.

It took eight years for ND to return to power. After three successive elections in 1989 and 1990, ND beat an electoral system designed by the PASOK government to penalize it, and achieved a tiny parliamentary majority despite a landslide victory. The expansion of the public sector during the previous years had led to the deterioration of the country's economic situation, and EC pressure for structural reforms were growing. Patronage sources shrunk, while the liberalization of the electronic media led to the creation of private radio and TV stations. The combination of these trends entailed a move away from mass mobilization and toward fundraising, greater professionalization, and "mediatization" of politics.

As a result, both parties are now engaged in a process of "cartelization," evolving into parties "whose campaigns are now almost exclusively capital-intensive, professional and centralized, and who rely increasingly for their resources on the subventions and other benefits and privileges afforded by the state."⁴⁰ In the 1993 elections both parties downgraded mass mobilization and concentrated instead on media campaigning. The 1994 European elec-

tions confirmed this trend: Television was flooded by party commercials, and for the first time the three major parties did not hold their ceremonial mass rallies in the center of Athens during the closing of the campaign. ND even decided against holding a mass rally in the 1996 elections. The shift of campaigning away from mass mobilization and toward the intensive use of the media is further confirmed by a look at campaign expenditures. The 1993 elections cost ND \$36.4 million, as opposed to just \$5.8 million in 1990; out of this sum \$12 million were spent on advertising alone.⁴¹ The 1996 elections cost ND close to \$7 million in TV commercials alone.⁴² In addition, mass organization became a cost rather than a fundraiser for the party. Although no data are available about the economic contribution of party members, it is clear that it was not substantial.⁴³ In fact, party organizations received a \$560,000 subsidy from the central party during the 1993 campaign.⁴⁴ Since the main benefit that party organization could deliver, mass mobilization, was downgraded, the overall tab was now largely negative.

Still, contrary to what this analysis would predict, this latest shift in political competition has not yet led to as sharp of a decline of membership as one would expect.⁴⁵ This is the second instance where the actual outcome diverges from the prediction offered by the framework of analysis. Apparently, the creation of a mass organization is likely to have lasting consequences, transcending the effects of political competition alone. What is more, party members appear to have wrested additional power within the party, most important the right to participate in the election of the party president. The present party leader, Kostas Karamanlis, was elected for the first time by an enlarged party congress, composed of 3,604 representatives (up from 1,983).⁴⁶ While it is too early to say if the relative persistence of mass organization is not just due to a time lag, it does underline the weight of past choices. Likewise, it remains to be seen whether the empowering of party members will counteract the decline of the party's mass organization.

Internal Politics and Splinter Parties

New Democracy has not been immune to internal disputes. In some instances these disputes were driven by ideological concerns. For instance, when ND lost the 1981 elections, the hard-line deputy Evangelos Averoff orchestrated the ousting of the moderate George Rallis and steered the party to the right. Often, these conflicts had a more personal dimension, like the conflict between Miltiadis Evert and his predecessor, Konstantinos Mitsotakis. Some times disputes were centered around demands by party cadres for more power within the party and/or critique of party strategy. Most disputes had mixed origins, blending ideological, strategic, and personal

concerns. The party has generally failed to develop democratic procedures for the airing and discussion of grievances, reflecting a political culture often suspicious of open expression of disagreement.

While disputes were frequent, only twice did they develop into full-blown party splits, threatening the party's domination of the center-right political space. The first split took place in 1985 when the defeated contender in the party leadership contest, Kostis Stephanopoulos, resigned from the party, followed by nine deputies, to form a new party called Democratic Renewal. As its name indicated, the party's objective was to renovate the center-right. However, it never managed to articulate a clear identity and remained torn between its message of political renewal and the conservative and old-fashioned character of its leadership. The second split took place in 1993 and initially appeared more threatening. It was caused by a personal clash between Konstantinos Mitsotakis and his young foreign affairs minister, Antonis Samaras. The latter resigned over a dispute about the Macedonian issue and left ND to form a new party, Political Spring. When two ND deputies defected to join his party they deprived ND government of its slim parliamentary majority and caused its downfall.

Samaras strove to convey the image of the leader of a young and dynamic political force battling against the "dinosaurs" of the "old parties" (ND and PASOK), while simultaneously promoting an uncompromising nationalistic stance. Otherwise, its program did not differ from that of New Democracy. Initially, the new party capitalized on the prevailing disenchantment from the lackluster performance of the two major parties; just after it was formed surveys estimated its support at between 15 and 20 percent.⁴⁷ However, the party did not make the expected breakthrough and obtained a meager 4.9 percent and ten seats. The results of the 1994 European elections, when the party won 8.6 percent of the votes and emerged as the third strongest party, reinforced its presence. However, the party failed to reach the 3 percent threshold in the 1996 elections (it got 2.94 percent) and lost its parliamentary representation. The advent of new younger leaders in the two major parties, the decline of nationalist feelings in the country, and the formation of a new protest party (the PASOK splinter DIKKI), contributed to the party's defeat, whose future is bleak. On the other hand, although the extreme right is politically represented by various small parties, it has not succeeded in securing any significant representation since 1977. The threat it has posed to ND remains, hence, insignificant.

Ideology and Policy

New Democracy emerged in 1974 as an essentially pragmatic party lacking a well-defined ideological profile. This attitude was reflected in its early

attempt to deny the relevance of political cleavages. The categories right, center, and left were rejected as being misleading, arbitrary, artificial, and insignificant.⁴⁸ The party defined itself in its statutes with vague and all-encompassing terms: "Democratic, modern, popular, social, radical, liberal, European, and national." This vagueness is explained by the Greek right's past self-definition, which was based to a considerable extent on opposition: *antivenizelist* during the interwar years, it became *anticommunist* afterwards. On the "affirmative" side, one could find nationalism and royalism. These ideological features were appropriated, and subsequently discredited by the colonels' dictatorship (whose main justification for the coup was precisely the presence of a communist threat).⁴⁹

The bankruptcy of the traditional ideology of the right forced Karamanlis to liquidate the past. He swiftly did away with anticommunism and royalism by legalizing the Communist party (outlawed in 1947) and abandoned the monarchy to its final defeat in the 1974 referendum.⁵⁰ ND engaged in a vigorous effort to deemphasize its association with "obsolete parties of the past" and to stress that it was neither a "mere continuation of ERE" nor a "personal party."⁵¹ While Karamanlis was successful in freeing the right from its traditional ideological anchors, he had trouble replacing them with new ones. His bet was that a European liberal profile, coupled with his project to get the country into the European Community, would provide the new party with a compelling and attractive ideology. He attempted to develop a new ideological profile under the ambiguous label of "radical liberalism," which was said to be lying between traditional liberalism and democratic socialism. This ideological project eventually failed: Joining the European Community was an abstract undertaking and radical liberalism was predictably too bland to inspire. The party's "confusing and contradictory image" contributed to its difficulties in the face of the rise of the ideologically aggressive PASOK.

Typical of the ambiguity of the party's profile was its position on the issue of state intervention in the economy. ND governments promoted vigorous state intervention and Karamanlis proudly underlined the implementation of wide-ranging nationalizations in the wake of the transition to democracy. The stress on state intervention was not surprising in a time of Keynesian hegemony and rising expectations following the collapse of the dictatorship. Again, Karamanlis justified his emphasis on social justice by stressing the goal of democratic consolidation: "When a people cannot attain social justice in the framework of democracy their trust in the ideal of democracy is shaken."⁵²

The 1981 defeat disassociated New Democracy from the state and forced a general rethinking of its ideas. Promoting a sharper ideological profile was also seen as central in attracting members to the party's

emerging mass organization. The attacks against PASOK proved useful in the short run but could not sustain the party's effort after 1984. The emerging neoliberal project came in handy. Its attractiveness lay in its coherent and clear set of principles (as opposed to wishy-washy pragmatism) and its opposition to the traditional, paternalistic, and state-oriented tradition of the right, which appeared obsolete. Moreover, neoliberalism provided the right with the opportunity to recast itself into a party that was modern rather than old-fashioned; ideologically assertive rather than defensive; and liberal rather than conservative. However, the attractiveness of the neoliberal project in a society extremely dependent on the state was bound to be limited. For the masses of public-sector employees and the self-employed linked to the state, the neoliberal agenda was a threatening prospect. There was considerable resistance within the party as well. The debate around this issue was temporarily settled by the adoption of a neoliberal party manifesto (issued in February 1985 and entitled "New Proposal of Freedom"), which turned freedom into "the basic overriding principle of all political and governmental activity." The expansionist public-sector policies and the "exceedingly powerful state" were castigated; "the limitation of the extent of the state, particularly in the economy" became the party's overriding priority.⁵³ The party ran the 1985 electoral campaign around the theme of "Liberal New Democracy." However, even assuming that neoliberalism could be attractive in Greece at the time, this ideological shift came too late to convince the electorate. Surveys indicate that close to 50 percent of respondents thought that the new theme was a mere "electoral trick."⁵⁴

The defeat of the party in 1985 was blamed by many within the party on "excessive liberalism," leading the leadership to reassess its ideological message and tone down its neoliberal agenda. The party's 1989–90 manifesto (entitled "Greece will not turn back") while still inspired by the neoliberal project was now promoted together with the slogan "Freedom-Creation-Social Protection." This program advocated an extensive program of privatizations, a drastic reduction in the number of appointments in the public sector, and a liberalization of the labor market. However, the debate during these elections revolved, initially at least, less on the economy and more on issues of corruption and scandals. The deterioration of the economy during 1990 and the collapse of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe provided a handy shortcut that allowed ND to promote its program while avoiding an extensive and potentially dangerous debate on its content.

After obtaining a parliamentary majority in April 1990, ND appeared poised to innovate with respect not only to PASOK's policies but also to its own past practice. Its symbolic reconciliation with the left, in the con-

text of the coalition government of June–November 1989, indicated a spirit of renewal and innovation. Its willingness to introduce economic reform was reinforced by the dismal economic situation of the country. On the basis of virtually any macroeconomic indicator Greece's performance was negative, diverging significantly from the other EU countries. Problems included high inflation rates, large public deficits, and uncertainty with respect to the basic rules of the economic game and the line separating the private from the public sector, leading to low rates of investment, decreasing international competitiveness, and low growth.⁵⁵ The EU pressured Greece to introduce radical economic measures by making major loan packages contingent on the achievement of certain performance targets. The convergence criteria for participation in the EMU put additional pressure on Greece. Structural adjustment reforms were no longer a choice predicated on ideological considerations, but a necessity imposed by international and domestic constraints.

However, results hardly measured up to expectations. On the political front, the ND government got entangled in the protracted and eventually damaging corruption trial of ex-prime minister Andreas Papandreu and several high-ranking PASOK officials. On the economic front, the far overdue program of privatizations was implemented with great delay and proved to be far more limited than promised. Some loss-making state-controlled enterprises were either sold or liquidated. But the two biggest privatizations were botched. While the government's deflationary policies (such as the freezing of public-sector wages and pensions) were predictably unpopular, they failed to bring under control the public deficit and public debt, bring down inflation substantially, and reduce the number of public-sector employees.⁵⁶ Widespread social agitation generated by union action contributed to the program's failure. Overall, the ND government proved "quite incapable of overcoming an image of generalized inefficiency, inertia, and sheer incompetence."⁵⁷ Predictably, ND came under sustained attack in the 1993 elections, both for the substance of its policies and the way it handled them. PASOK denounced the "sellout of public property" and pointed to the social costs of economic reforms. Besides its dismal record, ND was also hurt by allegations of corruption related to its handling of privatizations. Unable to assume the political cost of economic reforms, the perceived ineffectiveness of its policies, and the fallout from corruption allegations, ND was soundly defeated. After this defeat, Mitsotakis resigned and was replaced by Miltiadis Evert.

Following its 1993 victory, and under pressure from both the EU and the pressing problems of the Greek economy, PASOK gradually revised its statist agenda and undertook a program of economic reforms.⁵⁸ Indeed, the 1996 OECD report on the Greek economy, though calling for tougher

measures, took note of the progress Greece made in implementing structural reforms.⁵⁹ After his election as the head of the party in 1996, Kostas Simitis turned the modernization of the economy and the participation of Greece in the European monetary union into his central projects.

PASOK's bet was that it could implement these reforms more efficiently and less harshly than ND, while using its ties to unions to preserve social peace. During the electoral campaign, Evert attempted to stave off this challenge by adopting a populist discourse with nationalist overtones so as to attract the discontented. His strategy failed: PASOK suffered significant losses only on its left (to the Communist party, the Leftist coalition, and particularly the PASOK splinter DIKKI). It preserved its core centrist constituency and managed to expand its influence on its right, eroding the traditional social basis of New Democracy. This victory pinpoints PASOK's ability to transform itself despite political and economic constraints hostile to its (initial) ideology and the welfare of large segments of its supporters. In the long run, however, it is doubtful whether the PASOK government will be able to go forward with the implementation of these reforms without alienating increasingly wider segments of its social basis. Either it will carry out the tough reforms required by the present state of the Greek economy, thus provoking an acute internal party crisis and the prospect of desertion of a large part of its traditional electorate—especially the salaried public-sector workers; or, in an effort to preserve its social outlook it will settle on halfhearted reforms that will ultimately fail to address the country's economic problems and will undermine its credibility. How PASOK addresses this dilemma will have a decisive impact on Greek politics.⁶⁰

The 1996 defeat led New Democracy into a deep and protracted crisis. The inability of the party to benefit from the political shift to the right and win the elections was, predictably, a big disappointment. Evert was heavily criticized; he initially accepted responsibility for the defeat and resigned on election night, but recanted a couple of days later. He submitted his candidacy anew, won reelection in an atmosphere of internecine fighting, and contributed to the deepening of the party crisis.⁶¹ The March 1997 party congress elected a new party leader, the 41-year-old Kostas Karamanlis, a Thessaloniki deputy and nephew of former prime minister, president, and party founder Konstantinos Karamanlis. In the first round of the three-way contest, Karamanlis won 40 percent of the votes as opposed to 30 percent for Giorgos Souflis and 25 percent for Evert. In the second round, the congress rallied behind Karamanlis, who won 69.16 percent of the vote. Karamanlis, a young and relatively obscure politician with little experience, came from nowhere to win the party leadership. He was put forward by the party's conservative old guard who sensed Evert's imminent

defeat and wanted to prevent Souflis' election. In the first round, Karamanlis won the support of the massive party contingent from Macedonia. He was practically endorsed by Evert before the second round. Karamanlis' candidacy combined two contradictory features: novelty and tradition. The desire of party members for a young leader untainted by internecine fights was matched by the memories of past glory conveyed by his name (a popular chant at the congress was "here comes the new Karamanlis"). Obviously, youth and novelty are no guarantees for sound leadership, while an illustrious name is no substitute for experience. It remains to be seen whether Karamanlis will rise up to the tremendous challenge of redefining the party's strategy (even its character) and inspiring supporters.

Conclusion: Prospects for the Right at the Turn of the Century

New Democracy is confronted by two sets of challenges. The first one is related to the social and political impact of structural reforms; the second one concerns the particular strategy to adopt in order to face PASOK's successful right shift.

Both ND and PASOK will face serious challenges as a consequence of the widespread social disruption caused by the implementation of economic reforms. Large segments of Greek society will be directly affected and, as a result, the political landscape is likely to change radically. For example, the reduction of tax evasion will devastate the underground economy, a sector that accounts for 31 percent of the GNP and provides secondary jobs to one out of two public-sector employees. At the same time the existing welfare infrastructure is totally inadequate for dealing with such massive disruptions.⁶² Related to the consequences of economic reforms is the process of erosion of traditional collective political identities, expressed in the growing popular disaffection with the two parties—and politics in general. This trend was particularly visible in the 1996 elections (see table 4.2). Moreover, the abstention rate rose, while blank and invalid ballots reached record levels—up 100 percent from the previous elections.⁶³ Public-opinion surveys confirm the growing dissatisfaction with existing political parties: In April 1995, for instance, the number of respondents who felt underrepresented by the existing parties reached a record 64.6 percent.⁶⁴

Such developments open the door to political entrepreneurs willing to try their hand at populism. The fact that the European Union is seen as the primary force behind these economic reforms might generate an anti-European backlash. In such a context, issues like immigration and crime are increasingly likely to become politicized. For instance, immigration is

a new social phenomenon which began in the early 1990s. Like Spain and Italy, Greece was a country of emigration which suddenly finds itself on the opposite side: There are currently 100,000 legal, and between 400,000 and 500,000 illegal immigrants in Greece, the latter making up about 13 percent of the labor force. Illegal immigrants, mostly from Eastern Europe and the Middle East, are chiefly employed in agriculture, where they make up 31 percent of the labor force. Even though most immigrants live in rural areas, do not strain welfare services, and constitute a cheap and plentiful source of labor, their presence is viewed negatively by the public.⁶⁵ The perception that the surge in crime is related to immigration is likely to reinforce xenophobic attitudes. Likewise, relations between Greece and Europe might also generate populist mobilization. European attitudes toward Greece and the interpretation of such attitudes in Greece, constitute an issue of identity, relatively easy to politicize. Greece's economic performance and policies vis-à-vis its neighbors have attracted considerable criticism from its European partners and their media, and Greece is often portrayed as an "insufficiently European" country.⁶⁶ Greek reaction to such criticism has often been defensive, stressing precisely the distinct cultural dimension of Greek identity. While culturalist and isolationist arguments have so far failed to make any significant inroads in public opinion (particularly if compared to other European countries), the social consequences of economic reforms combined with the decline of the traditional political identities are likely to reinforce electoral volatility and centrifugal tendencies within parties, and provide an opening for populist and nationalistic mobilization outside the two dominant Greek parties.

On top of these broad challenges, New Democracy needs to respond to PASOK's move to the right. Its predicament is in many ways similar to that of the Spanish right during the 1980s—and many Eastern European and Latin American center-right parties today. Apparently, socially costly economic reforms enforced by international agencies in the absence of a socialist tradition and strong independent unions can lead to the wholesale adoption of neoliberal policies by left-wing parties—often under a "social" or even a populist discourse.⁶⁷ Indeed, PASOK has successfully taken over what was, only a few years ago, widely considered to be a neoliberal agenda. Faced with a choice between two parties that promote broadly similar policies, the median voter is likely, other things being equal, to opt for the party that appears more efficient and promises a more socially sensitive application of the reforms.⁶⁸ Programmatic similarity might also turn the electorate's attention to other factors, such as the personality of party leaders.⁶⁹ This situation is particularly ironic, since ND was at a marked disadvantage during the 1980s, when the societal consensus was in favor of

state expansion, and remains in the same position even though public opinion has shifted to the right.

New Democracy's economic program remains unchanged in its promotion of radical economic reforms, especially privatizations.⁷⁰ Tight international and domestic constraints make structural reforms inescapable: growth is still sluggish (2.1 percent in 1996); public debt reached 114 percent of the GNP in 1995; although inflation is down 20 percent from five years earlier (8.3 percent in 1996) it is still higher than the EU average, while unemployment rates are rising. Yet, at the same time, the party kept relying on a populist discourse that denied the reality of these economic constraints. This contradiction reflects the strategic impasse in which New Democracy finds itself following its recent defeat. The party faces the following dilemma: It can either choose a right-wing populist strategy in order to attract the losers of the adjustment process, or opt for an uncompromising modernizing strategy built around the argument that ND can better implement the reform agenda than PASOK. The populist strategy might be profitable in the short run, but it can also prove unconvincing, as indicated by the 1996 elections. ND lost upper-middle-class support to PASOK but failed to erode PASOK's discontented lower-middle- and working-class voters who were tempted by left-wing parties. Furthermore, whatever the electoral benefits of this strategy, it carries tremendous political costs in case ND wins and is forced to implement the very reforms it condemned as an opposition. On the other hand, the modernizing strategy might fail to tap effectively into mass discontent and would place the party at an initial disadvantage vis-à-vis PASOK's strategy of combining the implementation of reforms with some modicum of a social agenda. In the longer run, however, ND might benefit from the difficulties likely to be experienced by the PASOK government on the economic front and the internal divisions that will follow. What strategy is eventually chosen will determine whether New Democracy will regain its dominant position in Greek politics.

Notes

1. George Th. Mavrogordatos, *Rise of the Green Sun: The Greek Election of 1981* (London: Centre of Contemporary Greek Studies, King's College, 1983), p. 5.
2. See S. Ersson, K. Janda, and J. E. Lane, "Ecology of Party Strength in Western Europe: A Regional Analysis," *Comparative Political Studies* 18:2 (1985): 170–205; Oddbjørn Knutsen, "The Impact of Structural and Ideological Party Cleavages in West European Democracies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis," *British Journal of Political Science* 18:3 (1988), 323–352; and Yannis Papadopoulos, "Parties, the State and Society in Greece: Continuity Within Change," *West European Politics* 12:2 (1989): 54–71.

3. Richard Gunther and Jose Ramon Montero, cited in Takis Spyros Pappas, "The Making of Party Democracy in Greece" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1995), p. 322.
4. The absence of national election studies and reliable longitudinal survey data makes it difficult to track long-term trends. Reliable data from public-opinion surveys conducted at regular intervals, panel studies, and exit polls, became available only recently.
5. See Elias Nikolakopoulos, "I Eklogikiepirroi ton politikon dynameon" [The electoral influence of political forces], in *Ekloges kai kommata sti dekaetia tou 80* [Elections and Parties during the 1980s], ed. by Christos Lyrantzis and Elias Nikolakopoulos (Athens: Themelio, 1990).
6. John C. Loulis, "New Democracy: The New Face of Conservatism," in *Greece at the Polls: The National Elections of 1974 and 1977*, ed. Howard R. Penniman (Washington: American Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 1981), p. 76-77.
7. This trend was particularly visible in upper-middle-class Athens districts, where electoral support for ND collapsed to levels never seen after 1981 (with a significant parallel increase of PASOK and smaller parties). See Yannis Mavris, "Nees tasis tou eklogikou somatos" [New trends in the electorate], *I Kathimerini*, Sept. 29, 1996.
8. See Elias Nikolakopoulos, "'Apofasismenoi' kai 'anapofasistoi': I simvoli ton dimoskopiseon exo apo ta eklogika timmata stin analisi tis psifou" ["Decided" and "undecided" voters: The contribution of exit polls for the analysis of the vote"]. Paper presented at the Hellenic Political Science Association conference on the 1996 elections, Athens, December 3, 1996.
9. Richard S. Katz, and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," *Party Politics* 1:1 (1995): 5-28.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
11. Anders Widfeldt, "Party Membership and Party Representativeness," in *Citizens and the State*, ed. by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
12. Richard S. Katz, et al., *Party Organization: A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 1960-1990* (London: Sage, 1992); Widfeldt, "Party Membership," p. 173.
13. Richard Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 154.
14. Karamanlis was replaced by George Rallis in 1980, followed by Evangelos Averoff in 1981, Konstantinos Mitsotakis in 1984, and Miltiadis Evert in 1993.
15. Quoted in Pappas, "The Making of Party Democracy," p. 162.
16. These numbers should be treated with caution. For instance, it is well known that at least in the early stages many deputies registered massively their local clients in order to control the party delegates to the congress. See Loulis, "New Democracy," pp. 79-80.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
18. Michalis Spourdalakis, "Securing Democracy in Post-authoritarian Greece: The Role of Political Parties," in *Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 174.
19. Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activities in the Modern State* (London: Methuen, 1954), p. xxviii.
20. Dimitrios K. Katsoudas, "The Conservative Movement and New Democracy: From Past to Present," in *Political Change in Greece: Before and After the Colonels*, ed. by Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 100.
21. In 1993, Evert won 141 ballots out of the 182 cast by an electoral college comprising the members of the parliamentary group and party representatives.
22. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1996).
23. Pappas, "The Making of Party Democracy," p. 151.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 150. Concern about democratic consolidation is a more powerful explanatory variable than additional factors suggested by Pappas, such as the new political landscape which made old-style politics "simply not possible" and the desire of Karamanlis "to eliminate the autonomous power of his opponents" within the party. The first factor begs the question, while the second disregards the fact that formal (but no mass) party organization is no substitute for charismatic leadership when it comes to internal divisions.
25. Quoted in Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece*, p. 224.
26. For Karamanlis, "democratically constituted parties" stood in opposition to "short-lived ones." He argued that "a political party cannot exist for any reasonable length of time unless it is democratically organized so as not to identify its own fate with that of the leader." Even accession to the EC was justified in terms of democratic consolidation: As Karamanlis told the Athens ambassadors of the member-states the day the Greek petition was presented in Brussels (June 13, 1975), the Greek application was "first and foremost political, as it is concerned with the consolidation of democracy and the future of the nation." See Susannah Verney, "To Be or Not to Be Within the European Community: The Party Debate and the Democratic Consolidation in Greece," in *Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe*, ed. by Geoffrey Pridham (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 208; Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece*, p. 226; and Pappas, "The Making of Party Democracy," p. 145.
27. See Leonardo Morlino, "Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe," in *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, ed. by Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (Baltimore and London: Johns

- Hopkins University Press, 1995); and Geoffrey Pridham, ed., *Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990.)
28. See Loulis, "New Democracy," p. 13.
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
 30. George Th. Mavrogordatos, "The Greek Party System: A Case of 'Limited but Polarized Pluralism?'" in *Party Politics in Contemporary Europe*, ed. by Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair (London: Frank Cass, 1984), p. 158; Christos Lyrantzis, "Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of 'Bureaucratic Clientelism?'" *West European Politics* 7:2 (1984): p. 106.
 31. Pappas, "The Making of Party Democracy," p. 195.
 32. This mechanism might operate in an indirect fashion: The expectation of the charismatic leader's retirement at a crucial moment for the party's fate forced party elites to develop a formal organization guaranteeing party continuity, in order to ensure their political survival. The interesting question here is, why did the UCD party elites in Spain, seemingly facing a similar situation, fail to maintain the unity of their party?
 33. It has been noted about the 1977 preliminary party congress, that "far from being a mere facade of party activism, [it] offered its participants an opportunity for considerable involvement in the party's internal affairs." See Pappas, "The Making of Party Democracy," p. 156. The second party congress took place only six years later, in February 1986. In contrast, PASOK held its first congress in 1984, its second one in 1991, and its most recent (which elected Papandreou's successor) in 1996.
 34. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 275.
 36. See Lyrantzis, "Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece."
 37. See Mavrogordatos, "The Greek Party System," p. 159.
 38. ONNED expanded from 220 branches in 1979 to 470 in 1986, recruiting 50,000 members. The importance of this organization within the party was recognized in the 1986 congress, which doubled the number of ONNED representatives to party congresses. Likewise the workers' and farmers' party organizations (DAKE and SYDASE), were formed and became key players in their respective fields during the same period.
 39. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Consolidation, Legitimacy, and Iteration: Party Politics and Democracy in Greece, 1980-1985." Paper presented at the 1995 Symposium of the Modern Greek Studies Association.
 40. See Katz and Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization," p. 20.
 41. See *Oikonomikos Tachydromos*, June 2, 1994. The state subsidy reached \$22 million in 1993.
 42. See *Eleftheros Typos*, September 25, 1996.
 43. The official 1995 ND budget lacks an entry for members' contributions; it only reports income from fundraising campaigns (generally undertaken on an ad hoc basis). PASOK reports an income of \$281,800 from members' contributions, while the Communist party reports \$860,000. This is probably a good indicator of the "quality" of the parties' mass organizations. See *Oikonomikos Tachydromos*, June 20, 1996.
 44. See *Oikonomikos Tachydromos*, June 2, 1994.
 45. On this issue, see Susan E. Scarrow, *Parties and Their Members: Organizing for Victory in Britain and Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
 46. Prior to the 1997 party congress there was strong disagreement about the method of appointing representatives to the congress. The party leadership argued for the appointment to the congress of the (elected) boards of local and professional party organizations, whereas the party opposition demanded the direct election of congress representatives by party members. At the end, the position of the leadership prevailed. There is no evidence that indirect election is necessarily less representative of members' opinions. For instance, in the electoral college vote following the 1996 party's defeat, most parliamentarians voted for the outgoing president, M. Evert, while most party cadres supported the challenger, G. Souflis, thus reflecting the preferences of party members as registered in surveys. As Michalis Spourdalakis points out, "the role of [ND] membership goes beyond the mere legitimizing junction shaping party strategy." See Spourdalakis, "Securing Democracy in Post-authoritarian Greece," p. 174. Party members have also obtained (on paper rather than in practice), some input in the drafting of the party's candidate list. Candidates to the parliament are selected by the president and the party's executive committee from a list of potential candidates drawn after elections have taken place in regional party organizations. See Giorgos Papadimitriou and M. Spourdalakis, *Ta katastatika ton politikon kommaton* [The statutes of political parties] (Athens: Sakkoulas, 1994).
 47. Panayote Elias Dimitras, "The Greek Parliamentary Election of October 1993," *Electoral Studies*, 13:3 (1994): 235-239.
 48. Karamanlis' speech at the First Congress of ND, May 1979. See Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece*, p. 227.
 49. Royalism was discredited as well, because of the widespread perception that the king's interventions in politics during the 1960s paved the way for the dictatorship.
 50. See Mavrogordatos, "The Greek Party System," p. 158.
 51. ND party literature, quoted in Spourdalakis, "Securing Democracy in Post-authoritarian Greece," p. 174.
 52. Quoted in Katsoudas, "The Conservative Movement and New Democracy," p. 98.
 53. Quoted in Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece*, pp. 228-233.
 54. Katsoudas, "The Conservative Movement and New Democracy," p. 101.
 55. Loukas Tsoukalis, "Is Greece an Awkward Partner?" in *Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?*, ed. by Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); George Tridimas, "Greek Fiscal Policy and the European Union," in *Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European*

Integration and Balkan Disintegration?, ed. by Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996).

56. According to one estimation, at least 60,000 new employees were hired in the public sector during the 1991–1994 period. See *To Vima*, December 18, 1994.
57. George Th. Mavrogordatos, "Political Data Yearbook: Greece," *European Journal of Political Research* 26 (1994): 315–316.
58. European Union subsidies are crucial in sustaining the Greek economy—but they are declining. Greece's net benefit from the EU reached \$3.3 billion in 1995, as opposed to \$3.9 billion in 1994 and \$5.5 billion in 1992. See Tridimas, "Greek Fiscal Policy and the European Union," p. 55, and *To Vima*, January 21, 1996.
59. See OECD report quoted in *Eleftherotypia*, July 31, 1996.
60. The first indications conveyed by the 1997 budget are that the PASOK government has not yet managed to address this dilemma: On the one hand, the level of fiscal discipline is relatively low given the convergence targets, and no privatizations have been planned; on the other hand, the budget is not "social" enough to satisfy the party's populist wing and its lower-income constituency.
61. Evert won by 103 votes, while ballots were cast in favor of his competitor, G. Souflias.
62. For data on the underground economy, see a KEPE study, cited in *I Kathimerini*, December 13, 1992. Unemployment compensation stands at one-third of the European average despite the fact that the average Greek income is about two-thirds of the average European one; health spending per person (as percent of the GDP) is the lowest in the EU. See *Eleftherotypia*, July 26, 1996 and *The Economist*, August 3, 1996.
63. See *To Vima*, October 20, 1996.
64. See *Ta Nea*, April 19, 1995.
65. See Anna Triandafyllidou, "Greek Migration Policy: A Critical Note," *Synthesis: Review of Modern Greek Studies* 1:1 (1996): 15–22; G. Voulgaris, et al., "He proslepse kai he antimetopise tou allou ste semerine Ellada. Porismata empirikis erevnas" [The reception and confrontation of the other in contemporary Greece. Results of empirical research], *Greek Political Science Review* 5 (1995): 81–100, and *Eleftherotypia*, February 27, 1996. Still, the presence of foreigners in Greece only ranks as the tenth most important problem in Greece. See Voulgaris, et al., "He proslepse kai he antimetopise tou allou," p. 100.
66. See Featherstone and Ifantis, *Greece in a Changing Europe*. Bideleux echoes this attitude when he argues that the cold war "induced the West to treat Greece as part of Western Europe, in blatant defiance of cultural and geographical facts." See Robert Bideleux, "The Southern European Enlargement of EC: Greece, Portugal, and Spain," in *European Integration and Disintegration: East and West*, ed. by Robert Bideleux and Richard Taylor (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 129.
67. See Kenneth M. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case," *World Politics* 48:1 (1995): 82–116.
68. 1996 survey data indicate that 40.3 percent of respondents thought that a PASOK government headed by Kostas Simitis would be more efficient than a ND government headed by Miltiadis Evert (as opposed to 27.4 percent who thought the opposite). See *Ta Nea*, March 15, 1996. This perception can be attributed, to some extent, to the failure of the ND government in 1993–96.
69. Simitis was seen positively by 49.5 per cent of the respondents, as opposed to Evert's positive rating of 27.4 percent. See *Ta Nea*, March 15, 1996.
70. ND's recent "propositions for the economy" promote a radical privatization program, which includes a substantial part of the banking sector (close to 90 percent of which is still under state control), refineries and petrochemicals, shipyards, tourist enterprises, and basically all state enterprises operating in fields where the private sector can take over. The party is also proposing the partial privatization of the so-called natural monopolies (electricity, transportation).