is common for historians to argue that the topic they have studied for years stands at the center of the great issues of their period. Daly himself contends in his two books that effective security policing averted many crises and may have saved the tsarist state from destruction in the years before 1917. Thus the "watchful state" is given much credit for the relatively peaceful years from the end of the 1905 revolution to 1913. There is certainly some truth to that. Daly leaves no doubt that security policing was much more effective in the years after Zubatov and his successors introduced modern methods and that they helped disorganize and demoralize terrorist groups by 1909. However, as Daly also shows, a great failure of security policing—the unmasking of Evno Azef—contributed more to the disorganization and demoralization of the security police than any single success did to its efficiency and morale. This chapter includes a short discussion of yet another failure of security policing, Peter Stolypin's assassination in 1911. Nor should we forget that the existence of the Duma, the Stolypin agrarian reforms, a rapidly growing economy, and other factors helped temper the massive social unrest that had fueled the revolution of 1905.

My favorite section of the book is chapter 5, "A Moralist Running the Police Apparatus," Daly's fascinating portrait of Vladimir Dzhunkovskii. Previously the governor of Moscow and a personal friend of the new interior minister Nikolai Maklakov, Dzhunkovskii was appointed deputy interior minister for police affairs in early 1913. In many ways a high-minded throwback to nineteenth-century gendarmerie, Dzhunkovskii found many security policing practices dishonorable and was at least slightly ashamed of his new position. He ended the use of informants in the military and in high schools, tried to reduce the use of perlustration, dismissed many effective police officials, and dismantled networks of security bureaus around the country. Under Dzhunkovskii, the police budget shrank and security policing was weakened on the eve of the disastrous world war.

Daly's final two chapters examine security policing in the First World War and during the revolutions of 1917. In an epilogue, he suggests that lessons the revolutionaries learned from their sometimes unsuccessful efforts to evade the tsar's security police affected the development of their new police state.

The Watchful State is well written throughout. Not only is it painstakingly accurate about administrative details; it is also full of the drama of its time, and Daly brings many of the police and other officials to life. By drawing from an extraordinary number of memoirs as well as personal archives, the author is able to put faces on his protagonists and help us understand how they thought and why they acted as they did. Daly's latest book is a pleasure to read.

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Red Acropolis, Black Terror: The Greek Civil War and the Origins of Soviet-American Rivalry, 1943–1949. By *André Gerolymatos*.
New York: Basic Books, 2004. Pp. xix + 300. $27.50.

As one of the major European civil wars of the twentieth century, the Greek civil war has received disproportionate scholarly attention relative to the country's size. This is primarily due to the significance of this conflict in the broader context of the history of the cold war. It is, therefore, not surprising that several studies have been published in English and that new ones keep being added.

Interestingly, the study of the Greek civil war was confined for a long time to academics from Western Europe and the United States. Until 1974, the political situation in Greece did not permit the scholarly and dispassionate study of the war; in addition, most available archival sources were located in Great Britain and the United States. Such a distribution of resources biased the historiography of the conflict toward a primarily diplomatic direction and a close analysis of the interplay between Greek and non-Greek actors, with a

pronounced emphasis on the latter. This genre produced a near consensus about the high politics of the war but failed to address the political and social basis of the conflict. The implosion of the colonels' dictatorship and the transition to a genuine and full parliamentary democracy in 1974 signaled the delayed end to the civil war; the Communist Party was legalized, and the defeated side was at last able to tell its version of the story. It did so with such success that its grand narrative dominated the war's official history and was enshrined in monuments and school textbooks alike.

Things began to move again in the late 1990s, when a new generation of scholars, following in the footsteps of Mark Mazower's pioneering *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–1944* (New Haven, CT, 1993), began to challenge prevailing interpretations mainly through a "history-from-below" perspective. Using methods such as in-depth local studies and oral history, these scholars exposed the discontinuities and contradictions of the grand narratives and brought to light several suppressed aspects of the war, such as the role of ethnic cleavages, the dynamics of violence, and the behavior of noncombatants. This is very much a work in progress: the reconstitution of the vast mosaic that was the war in its various temporal, spatial, and social dimensions, as well as the precise links between the actions of the elites (both national and international) and the behavior of the masses, remains to be elaborated. Yet the influence of this body of work becomes obvious when practitioners of political and diplomatic history feel the need to incorporate it into their work.

André Gerolymatos, a Canadian historian of Greek extraction, has published several works on the political and diplomatic history of the Greek civil war. What sets *Red Acropolis, Black Terror* apart from his previous work is his effort to incorporate a "bottom-top" perspective and, thus, convey the perceptions and beliefs of ordinary men and women caught in the war's whirlwind. This is achieved through an overview of newspapers, memoirs published in Greece, and a few interviews.

On the whole, this effort is rather successful: the book is a broad and very readable synthesis. Some parts of the book—the chapter on the December insurrection, in particular—are gripping. An added strength is that rather than covering just the main phase of the civil war (1946–49), it includes the occupation and immediate postliberation periods, with a pronounced emphasis on the uprising of December 1944. In fact, the book sets up a very broad canvas, opening with the aftermath of the Greek military defeat of 1922 and closing with the arrest of the Greek terrorist group "November 17" in 2003. As an introduction to the Greek civil war, Gerolymatos's book can be read most profitably along with Mazower's seminal work and David H. Close's *The Origins of the Greek Civil War* (New York, 1995), a more detailed overview of the conflict that is curiously absent from the bibliography.

As is natural for such a broad introduction of a complex and multifaceted conflict, *Red Acropolis, Black Terror* does not avoid a number of pitfalls. First, it offers no new evidence or interpretations, and it lacks deeper insights beyond the familiar lament about the barbarity of civil wars. Second, some of the interpretations it does offer are expressed in a rather casual way without supporting evidence. For example, it is asserted that "what pushed Greek society over the chasm into civil war was the enduring national schism that had permeated Greece from independence" (11). Well, possibly, but how do we know? Moreover, Gerolymatos does not avoid a measure of sensationalism, as in some descriptions of the December insurrection and in his claim that the prison island of Makronisos "surpassed the medieval horrors of Devil's Island and resembled the gulags of Siberia" (5); a simple comparison of methods, goals, and fatality rates would easily show such a claim to be misleading—the horrors of Makronisos notwithstanding. Third, the book fails to incorporate recently opened Greek archival sources, most notably the archives of the Greek Communist Party, as well as some newly available material from the Soviet bloc. Fourth, there are some significant omissions from the bibliography. For instance, the interwar period cannot be discussed without reference to George Mavrogordatos's *Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936* (Berkeley, 1983),

and the events surrounding the December uprising cannot be recounted without reference to the work of Grigoris Farakos. Finally, while the effort to incorporate the experience of ordinary individuals is laudable, even just spicing up the text requires substantially more than the five interviews included.

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From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics. By *Slava Gerovitch.*
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002. Pp. xiv + 369. $42.00 (cloth); $24.00 (paper).

On September 9, 1985, the Soviet Union's perennial poet of permitted dissent, Yevgenii Yevtushenko, published a minor piece of verse in the newspaper *Truth* (*Pravda*) under the title "The Naysayers." Railing against those who had crushed the spirit of freedom and innovation during the preceding two decades, Yevtushenko's poem rattled off case after case of contemporary Soviet backwardness—all by way of lending support to Mikhail Gorbachev's nascent campaign of socialist renewal. "Shielding their fellow citizens from every harmful venture," wrote Yevtushenko bitterly, "the naysayers / Saw in the entire field of cybernetics only dark mysticism / And deprived our future children of computers."

Soviet readers could be forgiven for scratching their heads over this effort at high-tech pathos. As Slava Gerovitch's pioneering monograph demonstrates, the history of cybernetics in the USSR was neither uniformly dark nor predictable. Instead, his study of the most ambitious interdisciplinary movement of the cold war period suggests that cybernetics was itself partly responsible for the stunted development of Soviet computer technology. More important, Gerovitch shows how the strange career of the "science of control" (*kibernetik* is Greek for "steersman") sheds new light on post-Stalinist intellectual life, relations between the academic intelligentsia and the Soviet state, and the fate of utopian ambitions in the twentieth century's most aggressively utopian society.

As an object of historical study, cybernetics presents a diffuse target. Neither a discipline nor a technique nor a doctrine, it consists of an array of analogies between human beings and machines. As part of the global postwar cult of science and technology, cybernetics claimed to offer a universal method of solving problems by translating a variety of issues—from fields as diverse as biology, linguistics, and economics—into the precise language of mathematical formulas and computer simulation. Concepts such as "feedback loop," "entropy," and "signal-to-noise ratio" were taken from their original inorganic contexts and applied to living organisms, societies, and cultures. One of the many offshoots of the cybernetic approach, for example, is the use of computer software and hardware to model the functions of mind and brain.

Gerovitch briefly surveys the emergence of cybernetics in the West, particularly through the work of the renowned MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener. The book's main focus, however, is on the field's development in the Soviet Union from the early 1950s to the 1970s, as captured in a wide array of archival sources, published materials, and interviews conducted by the author. Gerovitch's approach blends discursive analysis (cybernetics as a kind of scientific Esperanto) with the history of institutions (as sites of competition and communication among groups of intellectuals as well as between intellectuals and the party-state). Part of the appeal of cybernetics to postwar Soviet intellectuals lay in its potential to displace the arid hegemony of Marxist-Leninist "dialectical materialism"—*diamat* to its native speakers, later immortalized by Orwell as "newspeak"—with an objective lexicon grounded in "exact methods" and ideological neutrality. In this sense, Soviet cybernetics can be understood as a vehicle for the de-Stalinization of Soviet science (in the broad sense of *Wissenschaft*). As the book's title suggests, however, cyberspeak soon took on many of the attributes and functions of newspeak, including semantic slip-